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ABSTRACT
The dark web is the hidden part of the internet that is not indexed by search engines and
is only accessible with a specific browser like The Onion Router (Tor). Tor was originally
developed as a means of secure communications and is still used worldwide for individuals
seeking privacy or those wanting to circumvent restrictive regimes. The dark web has become
synonymous with nefarious and illicit content which manifests itself in underground
marketplaces containing illegal goods such as drugs, stolen credit cards, stolen user credentials,
child pornography, and more (Kohen, 2017). Dark web marketplaces contribute both to illegal
drug usage and child pornography. Given the fundamental goal of privacy and anonymity,
there are limited techniques for finding forensic artifacts and evidence files when investigating
misuse and criminal activity in the dark web.
Previous studies of digital forensics frameworks reveal a common theme of collection,
examination, analysis, and reporting. The existence and frequency of proposed frameworks
demonstrate the acceptance and utility of these frameworks in the field of digital forensics.
Previous studies of dark web forensics have focused on network forensics rather than hostbased forensics. macOS is the second most popular operating system after Windows (Net
Marketshare, n.d.); however, previous research has focused on the Windows operating system
with little attention given to macOS forensics.
This research uses design science methodology to develop a framework for identifying
host-based artifacts during a digital forensic investigation involving suspected dark web use.
Both the Windows operating system and macOS are included with the expected result being a
reusable, comprehensive framework that is easy to follow and assists investigators in finding
artifacts that are designed to be hidden or otherwise hard to find. The contribution of this
framework will assist investigators in identifying evidence in cases where the user is suspected
of accessing the dark web for criminal intent when little or no other evidence of a crime is
present.
The artifact produced for this research, The Dark Web Artifact Framework, was
evaluated using three different methods to ensure that it met the stated goals of being easy to
follow, considering both Windows and macOS operating systems, considering multiple ways
of accessing the dark web, and being adaptable to future platforms. The methods of evaluation
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included experimental evaluation conducted using a simulation of the framework, comparison
of a previously worked dark web case using the created framework, and the expert opinion of
members of the South Dakota Internet Crimes Against Children taskforce (ICAC) and the
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI).
A digital component can be found in nearly every crime committed today. The Dark
Web Artifact Framework is a reusable, paperless, comprehensive framework that provides
investigators with a map to follow to locate the necessary artifacts to determine if the system
being investigated has been used to access the dark web for the purpose of committing a crime.
In the creation of this framework, a process itself was created that will contribute to future
works. The yes/no, if/then structure of the framework is adaptable to fit with workflows in any
area that would benefit from a recurring process.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Background of the Problem
The dark web is the hidden part of the internet that is not indexed by search engines and
is only accessible with a specific browser like The Onion Router (Tor). Tor was initially
developed by the US government for private communications and is still widely used by
individuals all over the world for that purpose. In addition to private communications, citizens
around the world access content restricted in their country, or as a way around restricted internet
sites in North Korea, Iran, or the Great Firewall of China, for example. In fact, the New York
Times has had a constant dark web .onion page for years to ensure people all over the world
can access their site regardless of internet censorship in their home countries. During the Arab
Spring, activists utilized Tor to circumvent government restrictions and communicate on social
media (Cattle, n.d.). However, the dark web has become synonymous with nefarious and illicit
content and there are a significant number of .onion sites that sell weapons, drugs, stolen credit
cards, stolen user credentials, child pornography, alleged murder-for-hire, hackers for hire,
exotic animals, stolen antiquities, and more (Kohen, 2017). Given the fundamental goal of
privacy and anonymity, there are limited techniques for finding forensic artifacts and evidence
files when investigating misuse and criminal activity in the dark web. In addition to the builtin anonymity of the browsers, the landscape of the dark web is constantly shifting with the
average lifespan of a dark web market being just eight months (Routley, 2018). Since the dark
web is not indexed like surface web sites, search engines such as Google, Bing, Yahoo are not
able to reach these sites. Finding traces of dark web activity indicating a connection to illegal
material may be the difference between a suspect being charged with a crime or being allowed
to go free to continue to commit these crimes. Therefore, providing evidence that a user has
accessed dark web market sites to acquire illegal goods or services is valuable to investigators
of these cases.
Therefore, the purpose of this design science research is to develop a reusable
framework to assist digital forensic analysts in acquiring host-based artifacts when conducting
computer forensic investigations involving suspected dark web criminal activity.

Novel
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approaches to investigate, acquire, and analyze dark web activity is being sought by agencies
worldwide. This chapter is organized as follows: section one details the history of digital
forensics and lists anti-forensic techniques used to thwart investigators including the use of
private browsers like Tor. The creation and evolution of Tor is detailed along with the
beginnings and history of the dark web. Understanding what makes Tor anonymous aids in the
understanding of new and innovative approaches for combating that anonymity when used for
criminal intent. The latest research on traces left behind by the use of Tor will be explored and
will include what can be found after using Tor to access dark web sites in several scenarios.
The beginnings of the dark web, dark web market sites, and the cycles of these market sites are
explained. The problem being addressed by this research is stated with justification supported
by first person interviews with a United States District Court Judge, a member of the South
Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) who is also a member of the Internet Crimes
Against Children (ICAC) task force, and a Special Agent with Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI). The end of this chapter outlines the objective of this research which is to
develop a reusable framework to guide investigators when searching for host-based artifacts
when their investigation is focused on crimes involving suspected dark web activity.

History of digital forensics
Although digital forensics is a relatively new field, the use of computers to commit a
crime is not new. The first example of password hacking was in 1961 at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) by Allan Scherr (Honan, 2012). Students were given passwords
to access shared computers but were given four-hour timeslots. Frustrated by the short time,
Scherr created a punch card to trick the computer into printing off all student passwords
allowing him to login as other students when time ran out. In 1971, Roswell Steffen embezzled
over a million and a half dollars from the Union Dime Savings Bank in Manhattan by
manipulating computer records (Fosburgh, 1973). Steffen removed funds from accounts and
covered his theft by making sure to transfer funds from other accounts into the depleted
accounts when automatic interest payments were due. Accounts accumulated interest at
different time periods, so Steffen was able to manipulate the accounts to ensure that each
account contained the proper amount at the time of interest calculation thereby not alerting the
acco n holders of heir deple ed f nds. S effen s sh ffling of mone be een acco n s

as
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caught while authorities were investigating an illegal gambling scheme he was part of (Liles et
al., 2015).
The advent of the personal computer (PC) in the early 1980s brought computers out of
labs and companies and into homes. Early on members of law enforcement recognized that
these PCs could contain evidence of crimes (M. Pollitt & HisTory, 2010). Some of these
individuals included those from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the United States Secret
Service, and the Department of Defense who collectively founded the International Association
of Computer Investigative Specialists (IACIS) in late 1989.

IACIS is the first known

organization dedicated to digital forensics and evolved out of the Computer Investigative
Specialist training course offered by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
in New Brunswick, Georgia. The course later came to be known as Sei ed Comp er and
Evidence Recover

or SCER and was the first course of its kind to offer training for the

seizure, examination, and extraction of evidence from computers that had been involved in a
crime and was a collaborative effort between federal, state, and local law enforcement ( IACIS
- HisTor , n.d.). Early investigations focused on stand-alone computers running a variety of
operating systems and were performed on whatever equipment was available. Early tools used
by investigators consisted of problem-specific command line tools or commercial data recovery
tools. The first commercial software created specifically for digital forensics is believed to be
SafeBack which was created in 1991 by Chuck Guzis. At this point in the evolution of digital
forensics, the primary audience was the law enforcement community (M. Pollitt & HisTory,
2010). In the 1990s, officers tasked with performing digital forensic investigations had minimal
or limited training and no official framework to implement to ensure repeatability in their
investigation. As both hardware and software technology evolved to include not only standalone machines but also internet-connected devices, the use of email, and cellular phones
capable of storing data, the need for specialized tools and training evolved. EnCase and
Forensic ToolKit (FTK) are two early commercially developed tools that are now considered
standards for use in digital investigations. Open-source tools such as Autopsy and The
SleuthKit have followed and are two popular options used by investigators ( Pop lar Comp er
Forensics Top 21 Tools, 2019).
The evolution of investigations has gone from looking for deleted files on a desktop
machine that may hold 40 megabytes (MB) of data to searching numerous devices that have
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multiple connections and within those devices data in various locations. On a single machine
an investigator may be looking for email information, database information, log files, memory
analysis, file analysis including deleted files, graphics and video analysis, internet browsing
history, and much more on a machine that may hold 10 terabytes (TB) or more of data
( Ama ing Fac s and Fig res Abo

he E ol ion of Hard Disk Drives - Pingdom Ro al,

2019).
The growth in digital forensics tools and expertise has brought the rise of anti-forensics
techniques. In his paper titled Arriving at an anti-forensics consensus: Examining how to define
and control the anti-forensics problem, Ryan Harris from The Center for Education and
Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS) at Purdue University describes antiforensics as any attempts to compromise the availability or usefulness of evidence to the
forensics process (Harris, 2006). Techniques for anti-forensics include data hiding, wiping,
obfuscation, storage prevention, and physical destruction.

Types of data hiding include

encryption, steganography, and storing data in areas of the hard drive that are difficult to find
such as slack space or alternate data streams. Wiping techniques include file or disk wiping
ili ies like Darik s Boo and N ke (DBAN) or BCWipe, and dega ssing

hich ses a

magnetic field to clean a storage device. Obfuscation techniques include log alteration or
deletion, altering metadata, and altering file extensions such as making a .jpg file look like a
.docx file. Prevention techniques such as private browsing prevent the saving of browsing data
like cookies, temporary internet files, and internet history. Browsers like Edge, Safari, Chrome,
Opera, Firefox, and Brave do not default to private or incognito browsing. A browser that does
do this is The Onion Router (Tor). When Tor is installed, the default settings are for cookies
to automatically clear on exit along with your browsing history (Perry, Mike; Clark, Erinn;
Murdoch, Steven; Koppen, 2018). A user installing and using Tor with the recommended
default settings is offered both prevention by not saving browsing information and encryption
when data is transmitted.

History of Tor
Initial work on what later came to be known as Tor began at the United States Naval
Research Lab (NRL) by David Goldschlag, Mike Reed, and Paul Syverson in 1995. In 1997
funding was contributed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a
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Uni ed S a es Depar men of Defense agenc

hose s a ed mission is

in es men s in break hro gh echnologies for na ional sec ri

( Abo

o make pivotal

DARPA, n.d.). The

original intent of the project was to protect online communications for United States military
personnel stationed overseas by preventing the pinpointing of their location using their internet
protocol (IP) address. Tor is still used today by law enforcement and intelligence organizations.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) announced in the summer of 2019 its own onion site
for users to view the CIA website (Hay Newman, 2019). According to CIA director of public
affairs Brittany Bram ell, o r global mission demands ha indi id als can access s sec rel
from an

here (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019).

In addition to not saving browsing information and encryption, Tor uses a technique
kno n as onion ro ing o send da a from he hos o des ina ion on a pa h con aining s ops
along the way. The origination of data is not known to the final destination, providing
anonymity with encryption being added to provide privacy. Normally when a connection is
made, the host computer makes a direct connection to the destination, so both know each IP
address. Tor uses a series of connections, known as nodes, to connect the host to the destination.
The first step in connecting to the Tor network is the client obtaining a list of Tor nodes from a
directory server (Figure 1).

Figure 1 - T
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During the second step, the client selects a random path to the destination server. For
each node the data will pass through, a layer of encryption is added. Each node has a decryption
key for only their layer and no other.
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Figure 2 - T
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As each node is reached, it decrypts a layer then sends the data to the next node. Only
when reaching the final destination is the data in an unencrypted form. If the user visits another
site, another random path is taken to the new destination.

Figure 3 - Another site visit - a ec
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This layering preserves the privacy of the data preventing eavesdropping. Additionally,
each node only knows the node it received the data from and the node it is sending data to, they
do not know the full path from the host to the destination which prevents traffic analysis and
creates anonymity (Syverson, 2005).
The project that started at NRL received the name The Onion Router or Tor when Roger
Dingledine, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) graduate joined Paul Syverson.
Later both were joined by Nick Mathewson, also an MIT grad. Tor was released as open-source
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software and initially had only a few dozen nodes. In 2004, the trio presented a paper titled
Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router stating that in May 2004 the Tor network consisted
of 32 nodes (24 in the US and 8 in Europe) and several hundred users (Dingledine, Mathewson,
& Syverson, 2004). Today, the Tor network consists of thousands of nodes and millions of
users making it one of the largest anonymity networks ( Welcome o Tor Me rics, n.d.). While
Tor started as a means for secure communication, is has become a network for those who
believe that all users should have access to a private, uncensored web ( Tor HisTor , n.d.).
Other networks such as Freenet and the Invisible Internet Project (I2P) exist that also provide
privacy protections. Of these, Tor is the most popular network so is the focus of this research
(Negi, 2017). The original purpose of the Tor network was to provide anonymity and privacy
and while many valid reasons exist for seeking anonymity, that anonymity also provides a
platform for those with criminal intent.
Tor can be installed on Windows, macOS, Linux, and Android systems. Tor can also
be used as part of a stand-alone, bootable operating system such as The Amnesiac Incognito
Live System (TAILS). TAILS can be booted using either a USB drive or DVD drive and states
that it leaves no trace on the computer unless the user changes the default settings. According
o he TAILS

ebsi e, i does no

se he hos comp er s hard drive. TAILS uses the system

RAM, but the website claims that RAM is automatically erased when the computer powers
down ( Tails - Pri ac for an one an

here, n.d.).

The Dark Web and Dark Web Markets
The world wide web can be broken down into three layers. The part of the web that is
available to the general public and accessible with search engines is known as the surface web
or the Clearnet. This area of the web is indexed by search engines such as Google, Yahoo, or
Bing and have content that can be accessed by anyone. Below the surface web lies the deep
web which contains the majority of the world wide web. The deep web holds information that
is accessible to a user with the correct credentials. Email accounts, bank accounts, medical
records, student records, corporate databases, and cloud data are some examples of deep web
information that can be accessed but require a link or credentials to ensure the user has the right
to access that information. Within the deep web is a small section known as the dark web. Dark
web sites require special software to access such as Tor or I2P and have sites that do not use
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the domain name service (DNS) to resolve easy to remember addresses such as www.espn.com
or www.dsu.edu but rather have links such as wcgqzqyfi7a6iu62.onion (Tor Project .onion
Page) or sntfgwfami5fdbn5.onion (Sonic the Hedgehog Gamer Site).
`

World Wide Web
Surface Web

Deep Web
• Not indexed
• Reachable with access

• Indexed by search engines
• Reachable by anyone
• Also called ”visible web” or
“Clearnet”

Login or Link

Examples:
• Email
• Bank Account
• Medical Records
• Student Records
• Cloud Data
• Social Media
• Legal Documents

Dark Web

small sliver of the deep web

• Special Software for access

Figure 4 - The World Wide Web

The beginnings of the dark web can be traced back to March of 2000 and the start of
Freenet, a peer-to-peer platform for censorship-resistant communication and publishing
(Moore & Rid, 2016). The privacy and anonymity of these networks led to the creation of
marketplaces as a means to exchange illegal and unethical goods. However, an early obstacle
of Freenet and Tor networks in the exchange of these illegal materials was payment. One of
he firs dark

eb marke places o se he Tor ne

ork

as The Farmer s Marke . The si e

offered various narcotics, including LSD, ecstasy, fentanyl, mescaline, ketamine, DMT, and
high-end marijuana (Security, 2012). Transactions were conducted using Western Union,
Pecunix, PayPal, I-Golder, and in cash making payment difficult and potentially traceable. The
Farmer s Marke

as sh

do n in 2012 as par of Opera ion Adam Bomb and res l ed in he

arrest of seven U.S. citizens and one Dutch citizen on charges of federal drug trafficking and
money laundering (Whitcomb, 2012).
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Figure 5 - I a e f T e Fa

e

Ma e (S

c12, .d.)

The advent of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies facilitated the growth in these
underground markets. The first darknet marketplace to utilize cryptocurrency as a form of
payment is considered to be the Silk Road, which initially consisted of illegal drugs of varying
pes. Crea ed in 2011 b Ross Ulbrich , a.k.a. Dread Pira e Rober s , he Silk Road

as

ultimately shut down by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in October
2013. Before it was shut down, the Silk Road sold drugs, guns, poisons, and contemplated the
sale of bodily organs while other items such as stolen personal information, child pornography,
and counterfeit currency were strictly off limits (Zajácz, 2017).

Figure 6 - Silk Road Anonymous Market (Nimuehr, 2018)
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When one market shuts down another begins. Just 35 days after Silk Road was shut
down Silk Road 2.0 began. When Silk Road 2.0 was shut down, Silk Road 3.0 launched 35
days later. At the time of shutdown of Silk Road there were five other active dark web drug
marketplaces. Since then, over one hundred sites have gone online with the average length of
operation being slightly over eight months (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug
Addiction, 2017). As of the writing of this paper in 2020, there are over twenty current sites
with the numbers shifting daily. These markets primarily offer illegal drugs with many more
sites offering stolen credit cards, PayPal cards, hacking services, stolen credentials, illegal
pornography, stolen antiquities, exotic animals, and worse (Paul, 2018).
At the same time as these drug sites were proliferating, sites containing graphic child
pornography were also growing. In July of 2013, Eric Eoin Marques was arrested in Ireland
for operating a dark web site containing over 1.4 million images of child pornography (United
States Department of Justice, 2019a). Marques was extradited to the United States in March
2019 to face federal charges of advertising and distributing child pornography. The site Playpen
was launched in 2014 with a user base of over 150,000 people from around the world before
being shut down in February 2015 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017).

While the

investigation, known as Operation Pacifier, is still ongoing, the FBI listed the arrest numbers
as of May 2017 as follows:
At least 350 U.S.-based individuals arrested
25 producers of child pornography prosecuted
51 hands-on abusers prosecuted
55 American children successfully identified or rescued
548 international arrests, with 296 sexually abused children identified or rescued
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017)
In 2016, a year after the Playpen site was shut down, a scan of Tor hidden services
revealed that almost 30 sites related to child pornography remained active (Cox, 2016).
Convictions related to the Playpen site continue with the most recent as of the writing of this
paper being September 2019 (Anash, 2019). Law enforcement has been successful in taking
down illegal market sites, however more come online in their place. Several operations since
the takedown of Silk Road in 2013 have successfully targeted dark web marketplaces.
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Operation Onymous in 2014, Operation Hyperion in 2016 (Cox, n.d.), Operation Bayonet in
2017, Operation Disarray in 2018 (Wegberg, Verburgh, Berg, & Staalduinen, 2017), Operation
SaboTor in 2019 all resulted in seized websites and several arrests ( Feds Disman led he DarkWeb Drug Trade

b I s Alread Reb ilding WIRED, 2019). The takedown of Wall Street

Market as a result of Operation SaboTor provided law enforcement with intelligence to pursue
the drug traffickers on these dark web markets. Operation DisrupTor was conducted in 2020
resulting in the arrest of 179 individuals with a seizure of $6.5 million in cash and
cryptocurrency, approximately 500 kilograms of drugs worldwide (The United States
Department of Justice, 2020). In the United States alone there were 274 kilograms of drugs
seized including fentanyl, oxycodone, hydrocodone, methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine,
ecstasy, MDMA, along with 63 firearms.
The dark web is a key search area for open source investigations conducted by firms
such as the Hetherington Group, a consulting, publishing, and training firm that is a leader in
due diligence, corporate intelligence, and cyber intelligence. The founder of Hetherington
Group, Cynthia Hetherington, MLS, MSM, CFE, CII, stated in a first-person interview that 20
to 30 percent of her investigations involve the dark web. According to Hetherington, many
companies are still struggling to understand the dark web (Hetherington, 2019).

Statement of the Problem
Dark web marketplaces are having a regional impact in South Dakota, around the
country and globally and contribute both to illegal drug usage and child pornography. Nearly
every crime committed today contains a digital component. Criminals who are cautious may
not leave obvious evidence on their digital devices identifying where or how they acquired
illegal contraband. For example, their browser data may contain little information indicating
criminal activity, they may not store photos of the illegal goods, they may not leave files on
their system indicating criminal activity. The built-in anonymity of the Tor browser can give a
false sense of security to criminals who have knowledge of how to access the dark web. Finding
traces of dark web activity indicating a connection to illegal material may be the difference
between a suspect being charged with a crime or being allowed to go free to continue to commit
these crimes. McGregor W. Scott is a United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
California and prosecutor of several dark web drug cases. Speaking about the recent case
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against Marcos Paulo De Oliveira-Annibale of Sao Paulo, Brazil who faces federal drug
distribution and money laundering charges for allegedly acting as a moderator on dark web
marketplace Wall Street Market, We are on he h n for e en he inies of breadcr mbs o
identify criminals on the dark web. The prosecution of these defendants shows that even the
smalles mis ake

ill allo

s o fig re o

a c bercriminal s r e iden i . (United States

Department of Justice, 2019b). That tiny breadcrumb may be hidden in the mountains of data
con ained on a s spec s machine. Digi al forensics was a key component in the evidence
collected and used to prosecute Ross Ulbricht, creator of the Silk Road dark web marketplace.
Da a collec ed from Ulbrich s lap op incl ded Bi coin alle s i h 140,000 Bi coins and a lis
of Silk Road servers (Hayes, 2015). A reusable, easy to follow framework being designed by
this research is needed to assist digital forensic analysts in identifying forensic artifacts on a
Windows or macOS system for the purpose of aiding law enforcement when conducting
investigations involving dark web criminal activity.
Regionally, South Dakota has seen convictions of users purchasing illegal drugs on the
dark web. A snapshot of these convictions:
2018

Four South Dakota men received federal prison charges for purchasing fentanyl

and cyclopropyl fentanyl on the dark web (KSFY News, 2018).
2019 A South Dakota man was convicted in federal court of purchasing MDMA, also
known as ecstasy, and other controlled substances from sellers in Europe via the dark
web for distribution in South Dakota (Epp, 2019).
2019

A South Dakota man was convicted in federal court for purchasing meth online

and reselling it to others (Klein, 2019).
2019

A California man is facing conviction for shipping 2.6 million fentanyl pills

nationwide which included Chamberlain, Mitchell, and Sioux Falls, SD (Kennecke,
n.d.).
2020

Seven South Dakota residents sentenced to prison for a dark web

methamphetamine purchase and distribution (Lewis, 2020).
To further establish the impact the dark web is having regionally, first-person interviews
were conducted with individuals with experience in the criminal justice system in South Dakota.
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Interviews were conducted with Judge Roberto Lange, Toby Russell and Craig Sherer and are
outlined below. These individuals were selected due to their work with dark web cases and
legal expertise in South Dakota from both a federal and state perspective.
Judge Roberto (Bob) Lange is a United States District Court Judge from South Dakota
presiding over the central region. Judge Lange has been a US District Court Judge since
November of 2009. Prior to being named to the judgeship, Judge Lange had 20 years of private
law practice with Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz and Smith, LLP of Sioux Falls, SD. Judge Lange
stated that since he became a US District Court Judge in 2009 that he as probably had 20-30
cases total come before him that involved the dark web or approximately 2-3 per year. He
stated that most do not get tried but rather end in a plea agreement. Judge Lange indicated that
the cases he is seeing involving the dark web relate to child pornography. Judge Lange stated
that the child pornography cases he has seen routinely involve the dark web and feels that child
pornography cases are steadily growing and always involve the use of the internet. The increase
in accessibility and ubiquitous nature of the internet contributes to this. Judge Lange indicated
that the cases that are prosecuted now seem to involve more images than cases 10 years ago
and that there are more cases overall as when he started he saw 1-2 cases per year and now sees
2-3 cases per year (Lange, 2019).
Toby Russell is a Special Assistant to the Attorney General (SAAG) within the South
Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) with 22 years of law enforcement experience
who has been working internet crimes since 2002 and has been on the Internet Crimes Against
Children (ICAC) task force since 2007.

SAAG Russell is aware of numerous drug

investigations in South Dakota that involve the purchase of drugs from the dark web using
cryptocurrency and being shipped in from overseas and since 2017 there has been an influx
with more and more individuals discussing getting drugs like heroin through dark web
p rchases. SAAG R ssell s e perience with ICAC cases is that the dark web is used as a
communication platform for individuals seeking child pornography and provides what is
believed by these individuals to be a secure mechanism for connecting with like-minded
individuals. SAAG Russell has seen cases where little evidence remains except for a statement
from a suspect that they are using the dark web which then leads to a forensic examiner finding
hese remnan s. I is SAAG R ssell s e per opinion ha

e

ill con in e o see an increase

in dark web activity in South Dakota, particularly in cases of illegal drugs. In addition, SAAG
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Russell believes South Dakota will begin to see an increase in illegal weapons and stolen
property being obtained from the dark web as it is not monitored by law enforcement (Russell,
2020).
Craig Sherer is a Special Agent with HSI, a position he has held since December 2004.
Special Agent Sherer has been involved in local dark web investigations including one which
resulted in the seizure of approximately 1 kilogram of Methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(MDMA), commonly known as Ecstasy, along with approximately $36,000 in Bitcoin
contained on a seized phone. Special Agent Sherer believes the individuals using the dark web
to purchase illegal drugs to have enough sophistication to enable them to purchase drugs on
dark web markets but these users feel secure in the ordering process to not take further
preca ions o mask heir ac i i ies. I is Special Agen Sherer s e per opinion ha dark eb
crimes will continue to increase in South Dakota as currently investigators have seen an increase
in the amount of opioid cases with the local street value being higher than the going rate on the
dark web. The dark web being a world market drives the prices lower so it can be purchased
from overseas and then resold locally at a profit (Scherer, 2020).
The expert opinions of these individuals indicate a growing presence of dark web
criminal activity. In addition, previous research has focused on network artifacts or solely on
Windows-based artifacts. Therefore, a need exists for identifying host-based artifacts of dark
web activity in criminal investigations.

Research Question
Based on the background information provided in this research regarding the impact of
dark net markets at not only an international or national but rather local level, the following
questions will be examined in this research:
What host-based artifacts can be identified on a system running either Windows PC
or macOS when the user has been accessing the dark web using Tor or Tails?

Objectives of the Project
The primary objective of this project is to design a framework that can be used by digital
forensic analysts when searching for host-based artifacts on a computer where the use of the
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dark web is suspected in the commission of a crime. Using the open-source OSINT Framework
as a template to facilitate its use (Nordine, n.d.), this project will create a framework that can
be used to aid in the search for and identification of artifacts indicative of dark web use for
criminal intent. The use of this framework by forensic analysts will provide a roadmap to assist
in locating dark web artifacts on a system by a user who is a suspect in a criminal investigation.
These hard to find artifacts aide law enforcement in building a case against a suspect who is the
subject of an investigation of a crime involving dark web activity.

Organization of this Paper
This research is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of related and
relevant literature. Chapter 3 addresses the design science research methodology used for this
research and poses the questions that will be answered in the course of this research. Chapter
4 describes the design of the Dark Web Artifact Framework. Chapter 5 is a comprehensive
treatment evaluation to confirm the validity of the designed framework. Chapter 6 concludes
this dissertation and discusses limitations and potential future work.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This chapter reviews existing literature that addresses digital forensics frameworks,
previous studies regarding identifying dark web artifacts, and discusses the gap that exists in
both Windows and macOS forensics. A common theme emerges in the previous studies of
digital forensics frameworks of collection, examination, analysis, and reporting. The existence
and frequency of proposed frameworks demonstrate the acceptance and utility of these
frameworks in the field of digital forensics. Studies of dark web forensics have previously
focused on network forensics to identify the source of dark web sites or to deanonymize users.
Additional research has been conducted using live memory analysis and host-based artifacts on
a system running the Windows operating system. This chapter concludes with the inclusion of
cryptocurrency as a possible artifact indicative of dark web criminal activity.

Digital Forensics Frameworks
Several frameworks or models to assist in digital investigations have been presented
that outline the overall process for conducting a digital investigation. These frameworks
provide a repeatable process that address the key aspects in digital forensics of reliable,
repeatable, and verifiable results (Forensic Focus, 2012). Some of these frameworks have many
phases such as the Enhanced Integrated Digital Investigation Process proposed by
Baryamureeba and Tushabe in 2004 (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004) which has 21 phases,
while others have few phases such as the Investigation Framework by Kohn, Eloff, and Olivier
in 2006 (Kohn, Michael; Eloff, JHP; Olivier, 2006) which has three phases. The frameworks
outlined below highlight some of the more cited frameworks that have been presented. The
common theme that emerges from these frameworks is the overall process of collection,
examination, analysis, and reporting.
One of the first digital forensic models was presented by Special Agent Mark M. Pollitt
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the 18th National Information Systems Security
Conference in 1995 (M. M. Pollitt, 1995). Pollitt outlines a four-step process of acquisition,
identification, evaluation, and admissibility of evidence drawing a parallel to paper evidence.
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Figure 7 - Approach to Evidence in Cyberspace (M. M. Pollitt, n.d.)

Pollitt points out that the process of presenting paper evidence is clear and obvious
because it is visible to the human eye whereas digital evidence requires the use of tools and
must follow a process that is documented, reliable, repeatable, and presentable to members of
the court for it to be useful in a criminal case. Three of the four phases of the process are shown
to contain both legal and technical aspects. When acquiring evidence, legal authorization must
be present before acquisition while searching for that evidence may require technical
knowledge for manipulating the digital device and determining the location of the evidence.
Identifying evidence requires technical knowledge of the device and being able to explain
where the evidence physically and logically resides within the device as well as being able to
view the evidence in context to ascertain the relevance and meaning. The example Pollitt gives
of this is being able to look at data in HEX, ASCII, EBCDIC, or within an application. Finally,
evaluation of the data requires both legal and technical judgements. Conclusions are reached
when viewing evidence from a technical view of how data was produced, how it was accessed,
who accessed it, and when it was accessed. Legally it must be determined if the data is relevant,
if it is reliable, and if one can testify to it. Pollitt makes the conclusion that if information is
not able to be admitted as evidence, then legally it does not exist. Both law and science must
be used together to both identify evidence and explain its significance.
An abstract digital forensics model was proposed in the Fall 2002 edition of the
International Journal of Digital Evidence by Mark Reith, Clint Carr, and Gregg Gunsch (Reith,
Mark; Carr, Clint; Gunsch, 2009). The goal of this model was to provide a standardized method
for digital investigations without making it tool-specific. Rei h, Carr, and G nsch s model
draws on previous models and includes nine key steps of identification, preparation, approach
strategy, preservation, collection, examination, analysis, presentation, and returning evidence.
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Figure 8 - Abstract Digital Forensics Model (InfoSec, 2016)

The model allows for expansion into sub procedures as needed, giving the example of
including sub procedures under the examination category of volatile and non-volatile storage.
The authors include both advantages and disadvantages of their proposed model. One point
that is included as both an advantage and a disadvantage of their model is the generalized
methodology. It is an advantage as it provides the ability to relate a technical process to the
non-technical observer, however the authors acknowledge that the proposed model may be too
general to be of practical use.
Based on the model proposed by Reith, Carr, and Gunsch a framework for collecting
digital evidence was proposed in 2004 by researchers Brian Carrier and Eugene Spafford
(Carrier & Spafford, 2004). Carrier and Spafford created an event-based framework based on
procedures used when investigating a physical crime scene.

Figure 9 - Carrier and Spafford Graphic Representation of the Major Categories of Phases in the Framework (Carrier &
Spafford, 2004)

This framework includes five phases focusing on the overall picture of gathering digital
evidence. Included are phases for readiness, deployment, physical crime scene investigation,
digital crime scene investigation, and finally presentation. The readiness phase ensures the
appropriate training, tools, and equipment configuration are prepared for the investigation. The
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deployment phase is when incidents are detected, confirmed, and the proper authorization for
investigation is obtained. The physical crime scene investigation phase is the identification of
devices at a crime scene that may contain digital evidence. The collection of these devices
leads to the digital crime scene investigation phase. The digital crime scene investigation phase
is further segmented to include system preservation and documentation, evidence searching and
documentation, and event reconstruction and documentation. The final stage is presentation
where the results are presented either to a corporate audience or to a court of law. This model
proposed by Carrier and Spafford provides a high-level overview of a digital investigation,
however lacks specific details of an investigation.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Guide to Integrating
Forensic Techniques into Incident Response released in 2006 describes a basic forensic process
of collection, examination, analysis, and reporting (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, & Dang, 2006).

Figure 10 - NIST Basic Forensic Collection (Kent et al., 2006)

In this guide, the forensic process is described as a way to transform media into evidence.
Collection of data includes identifying any possible media sources that may contain data both
obvious and nonobvious. Obvious sources of data include items located in the physical area
including desktops, laptops, thumb drives, CDs, cell phones, digital cameras, and volatile data
contained on a system that is running. Nonobvious sources may be located in other locations
and include logs from an internet service provider (ISP), information recorded by other
organizations, or laptops owned by employees rather than the organization. Nonobvious
sources may require court orders or have other legal constraints to consider. After data has
been identified it needs to be acquired from the source in a three-step process. A plan is devised
to acquire the data, the data is acquired, and the data is verified to ensure integrity. All steps
need to be performed in a manner that supports any future legal action. The next phase of the
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forensic process is examination which transforms the media into data. Relevant information is
extracted from the media that has been collected using available tools and techniques, for
example determining the type of file being examined or using text or pattern search techniques.
The analysis phase takes the data extracted during examination and transforms it into
information. Analysts study the data from all available sources looking for connections
between people, places, and events. The final phase of reporting takes the information obtained
from the analysis phase and presents it as evidence. A final step in the reporting phase includes
identifying any policy or procedural deficiencies that exist that can be remedied before the next
event.
A more extensive framework produced by the Department of Justice by Ovie L. Carroll,
Stephen K. Brannon, and Thomas Song of the Cybercrime Lab Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) is the Digital Forensic Analysis Methodology (Oliver,
Brannon, & Song, 2008).

The methodology includes a flowchart detailing the

preparation/extraction, identification, and analysis phases of their overall forensic process. The
overall process includes the steps of obtaining and imaging forensic data, the forensic request,
preparation/extraction, identification, analysis, forensic reporting, and case-level analysis. The
flowchart details the middle three steps of the process and is shown in Appendix A.
The chart follows steps of a yes/no, if/then process for each stage with a Return on
Investment strategy of determining when to stop the process. Five lists are included with the
flow chart that are referenced at various stages during the process. Search leads, extracted data,
relevant data, new data source leads, and analysis results are included in the framework with
examples of how they are used and room for messages or notes. While progressing through the
flowchart there are references to using each list. For example, during the preparation/extraction
phase after selection of the appropriate forensic tool the requested data is extracted and added
o he Prepared/E rac ed Da a Lis . Follo ing he addi ion o he Prepared/Extracted Data
Lis

he da a search lead is marked as processed on he Da a Search Lead Lis . The

preparation phase starts with determining whether there is sufficient information to start the
process. The following steps of the preparation phase is the setup and validation of forensic
hardware and software, choosing the appropriate forensic tools, extracting the data, and
determining whether all relevant data has been processed. The identification phase starts where
the preparation phase ends, with determining whether all relevant data has been processed. If
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so, the identification phase continues leading to the analysis phase. If not, then a decision is
made of what type of item has not been processed, whether it is relevant to the request that was
made and whether it is within the scope of the warrant pertaining to the case. The analysis
phase determines if there is sufficient data to be analyzed or if more data is needed. The analysis
phase covers the who, what, where, when, and how of the data being analyzed. Other associated
artifacts such as registry entries and metadata are considered which may indicate links to other
items or events. Findings are documented on a timeline or other forms and the reporting process
begins. The entire process can loop back to a previous phase at the identification, analysis, or
case-level analysis phases to repeat if needed to provide more information.
The E plore, In es iga e and Correla e (EIC) frame ork

as presen ed a he 2010

International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security by Grant Osborne, Benjamin
Tunstill, and Jill Slay of the University of South Australia (Osborne, Turnbull, & Slay, 2010).

Figure 11 - EIC Framework Overview (Osborne et al., 2010)

The EIC frame ork is described b
o address iss es s rro nding scalabili

he a hors as a high-level conceptual framework

and comprehension of digi al e idence . The goal of
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the EIC framework was to use visualization of information to streamline the processes and tasks
of locating digital evidence in the growing number of devices and the complexity of devices in
a manner that is scalable to the ever-increasing storage capacity of these various devices that
investigators encounter.

Visualization of information is a computer-aided, interactive,

graphical representation of data (Ware, Mire, Kuniavsky, & Snyder, n.d.). It is a way for
investigators to visually see and interpret relationships and concepts within vast amounts of
data that may not otherwise be apparent. The EIC framework consists of three main phases of
explore, investigate, and correlate. The explore phase is the identification of the types of data
that are included and to provide an overview of the data as it relates to the crime being
investigated. The investigate phase includes zooming in on data and filtering data to refine the
data. Keyword searches are performed, event data is examined which includes file creation,
modification, and deletion, and entities such as unique users or applications are identified.
Visualization of these events aids in determining connections between events and entities.
From this information a timeline of events can be established. The correlate phase combines
the overview visualizations from the explore phase with the more focused visualizations of the
investigate phase including evidence from all sources for correlation.

Overall the EIC

framework aims to be scalable to large amounts of data and to enable investigators to
incrementally build a visual, presentable view of data that can help reduce the complexity of
presenting findings from diverse sources.
The number of existing digital forensics frameworks demonstrates that they are an
accepted practice in the field of digital forensics that enable analysts to conduct thorough
investigations. Additionally, they provide the repeatable process that addresses the key aspects
in digital forensics of reliable, repeatable, and verifiable results. Each of these frameworks
outline the overall forensic process in a similar way with each presenting a slightly different
approach. The research proposed in this study uses a comprehensive, reusable framework to
enable analysts to find artifacts indicative of dark web criminal activity to aide in the
prosecution of crimes committed using the dark web.

Dark Web Forensics
Previous studies regarding identifying dark web activity have centered around
identifying users on the Tor network by utilizing techniques that de-anonymize these users at
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the entry or exit nodes of the network. While they are difficult to exploit, vulnerabilities do
exist in the Tor browser that can result in the de-anonymization of users (Jacoby MenTor &
Chow, 2016). Two extremely unlikely scenarios are collecting data by controlling all of the
nodes on a circuit used or controlling only the entry and exit nodes used by a particular user.
There have been instances of malicious scripts being used to infect computers of visitors of the
dark web that cause identification of those users. An example of this is he FBI s sei re of he
dark web hosting service Freedom Hosting in which the FBI placed malware on the servers that
then infected the users visiting the Freedom Hosting sites that held child pornography allowing
the FBI to identify those users (Poulsen, 2013).
The Washington Post reported on a paper written in 2006 for the National Security
Agenc s (NSA) Cr p anal sis and E ploi a ion Ser ices classified as Top Secret but shown
on The Washington Post web page (The Washington Post, n.d.). The goal of the research was
to review the Tor source code to search for vulnerabilities. The paper discusses using traffic
analysis techniques, including tracing circuits, and was described as an unrealistic, but powerful
attack using technology available at the time.
In addition to Tor, dark web sites can be accessed using other methods. The Amnesic
Incognito Live System (Tails) is designed to be a live, bootable operating system that can be
run from most computers by using either a USB drive or a DVD ( Tails - Privacy for anyone
an

here, n.d.). Little academic research has been done on Tails. Tails comes with Tor

installed and also gives the option to use the Invisible Internet Project (I2P), an alternate
anonymous network, rather than Tor (Cardenas-Haro & Dawson, 2016). Tails claims to
provide privacy and to leave no trace on the system it is booted to, however errors by users can
lead to the loss of privacy. Users who download files, bookmark sites, or install browser plugins run the risk of leaving traces on the device they are booting from whether it is a USB or
DVD.
Anonymous browsing is also possible using other operating systems that have been
developed with the intention of secure, anonymous communication. Whonix is an operating
system designed to run within a virtual machine (VM) and was developed to use the Tor
network. It is based on the Debian operating system with multiple layers of virtual machines
and comes with pre-installed, pre-configured applications ( Whoni , n.d.).
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In addition to the Tor network, other dark web networks exist that require a different
method of access. A forensic analysis case study has been done on the Invisible Internet Project
(I2P) network, a dark web network similar to, but different from Tor (Bazli, Wilson, & Hurst,
2017). I2P ses eepsi es ra her han he .onion addresses ha are sed b Tor. The study
discusses the difficulties in detecting I2P installation and use on a host machine. Commercial
forensic software packages such as EnCase and FTK are not able to analyze or detect I2P
artifacts or I2P activity. With modifications, detections are possible by using hash detection
from the installer files for I2P.
Freenet is network that uses a peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture whose design intention
as he pre en ion of censorship and main enance of pri ac

(Miller, Hong, Wiley,

Sandberg, & Clarke, 2002). Users of Freenet dedicate some of their own storage space by
running a node on the network. Files stored on Freenet sites are stored on multiple computers
so if one user node is not available a file can still be retrieved through a different node. Evidence
of a Freenet installation on a system is available, however the files are encrypted so their
contents are unknown.
Memory analysis and Registry file analysis was explored in a study published in 2015
by researchers at Marshall University working with members of the West Virginia State Police
Digital Forensics Unit. Together they published a paper in which they used a combination of
host-based forensics and network forensics to identify artifacts indicating dark web use (Darcie,
Boggs, Sammons, & Fenger, 2015). Using RAM dump analysis, Registry file analysis, and
packet capture the researchers were able to find useful information in each area they searched.
A limitation they acknowledged was the use of RAM analysis on a live machine. This is not
always an option for law enforcement as the state of the machine is not always controllable.
Additionally, Registry file analysis showed that Tor had been used but no specific browsing
activity. The existing research done by Marshall University and the West Virginia State Police
provides a foundation for this proposal that would be expanded upon further.
An August, 2017 article for the International Journal of Emerging Trends & Technology
in Computer Science (IJETTCS), Dr. Digvijaysinh Rathod proposes a framework for dark web
forensics (Dr. Digvijaysinh Rathod, 2017). Dr. Ra hod s proposed frame ork is a broad
overview of categories broken down into Tor forensics and Bitcoin forensics. Tor forensics
includes random access memory (RAM) forensics, Windows Registry changes, network
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forensics, and database information. Bitcoin forensics includes an analysis of Bitcoin wallets.
Dr. Rathod s frame ork pro ides a good s ar ing poin for a frame ork and s gges s ools o
be used but lacks specific information for locating the proposed categorical artifacts.
Recent research performed on a Windows 8 virtual machine included analyzing Tor
artifacts including memory, hard disk, and system registry with the Tor browser open and closed
revealing several artifacts (Jadoon, Iqbal, Amjad, Afzal, & Bangash, 2019). The study largely
involved normal user activity with little connection to dark web sites but rather connected to
Clearnet sites through the use of the Tor browser. The research by Jadoon, et.al. would provide
additional foundation for this proposal.

A

he ime of his research, here

asn

a

corresponding study for Windows 10. Research on artifacts on a Windows 10 operating system
focused on Tor artifacts found when Tor is installed but did not include visits to dark web sites
(Warren, 2017).
Dark web investigations often include detecting traces of cryptocurrency use as it is the
payment method for transactions made on dark web marketplaces. Artifacts are left behind
when users install the software required to have a bitcoin wallet (Wadas, 2018). Directories,
subdirectories, and file names are able to be located on a system image. File directories are
crea ed in a ser s personal folder nder AppDa a\Roaming\Bitcoin i h s bfolders of blocks,
chains a e , and da abase . Also incl ded in he Bi coin folder are he files .lock , db.log ,
deb g.log , peers.da , and

alle .da . Researchers a he University of Luxembourg,

Qatar Computing Research Institute, and Qatar University performed analysis on Bitcoin
transactions using a combination of open source intelligence (OSINT) and blockchain
transactions to link 125 unique users to dark web hidden services. Their conclusion was that
users that use Bitcoin as a payment method on dark web marketplaces can be deanonymized
(Al Jawaheri, Al Sabah, Boshmaf, & Erbad, 2020).

Conclusion
There are many existing frameworks for digital forensics which demonstrates their
value to the field. These existing frameworks provide a foundation for the framework proposed
for this research. Collection, examination, analysis, and reporting are common categories that
are included in these frameworks and are important to digital investigations to ensure that
findings are considered usable evidence. These frameworks help to provide reliable, repeatable,
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and verifiable results. Research has previously been done to deanonymize Tor usage to detect
users who are visiting dark web sites, however rather than viewing artifacts left behind on a
host these have focused on network monitoring. In addition, users paying for dark web
purchases with Bitcoin who also publicly share their wallet addresses on social media are able
to be deanonymized which also does not focus on host-based artifacts as this research will.
Previous research has also focused on artifacts left behind on Windows systems including live
memory analysis and host-based analysis including Windows Registry changes as a result of
dark web activity. The research proposed in this study will expand upon live memory forensics,
Windows Registry modification, and include any newly identified artifacts to create a reusable,
comprehensive framework for identifying artifacts on a host machine that has been used to
access the dark web for criminal intent.
Further, this research will abstract away from a particular operating system thereby
extending its applicability to other operating systems such as macOS. While Windows holds
the majority of the market share of operating system use, macOS is the second leading operating
system and appears to be growing (Net Marketshare, n.d.). This proposal will consolidate and
combine existing knowledge with any newly discovered artifact locations including both
Windows and macOS operating systems to create a comprehensive, reusable, multi-use
framework that will provide investigators an avenue for discovering useful artifacts on a system
used to access dark web sites for criminal intent.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOG
Introduction
This chapter explains the research method chosen and the steps that will be taken to
complete this research. Research methodology is the process followed by a researcher to solve
the proposed problem (Rajasekar, Philominathan, & Chinnathambi, 2014). It provides a
systematic approach of steps to walk through while studying the research problem (Kothari,
2004). The purpose of this study is to develop a usable framework for identifying host-based
artifacts during a digital forensic investigation involving suspected dark web use. The dark web
is shrouded in anonymity and is heavily encrypted. Both of these traits, along with the general
mystery surrounding the dark web, lend itself to criminal activity. Accessing the dark web
requires the use of a special browser such as The Onion Router (Tor). While other browsers
exist, at this time Tor is the most popular so has been chosen for this research ( Ho

o Access

the Dark Net and Deep Web Safely - S ep b S ep G ide, n.d.). The Tor homepage,
www.Torproject.org, states the purpose of Tor as: Browse Privately, Explore Freely, and defend
against tracking and surveillance ( Tor Projec , n.d.). The default setting for Tor is to clear
cookies upon exit and delete any browsing history. The intentions of The Tor Project and
default settings make finding host-based artifacts difficult, but not impossible.
Upon completion, the expected result of this research is a reusable, comprehensive
framework that is easy to follow and assists investigators in finding artifacts that are designed
to be hidden or otherwise hard to find.

The contribution of this framework will assist

investigators in identifying evidence in cases where the user is suspected of accessing the dark
web for criminal intent when little or no other evidence of a crime is present.

Research Method
This research will implement design science to create an artifact to meet a specific goal.
Design science focuses on creating something with a specific purpose in mind to add value or
improvement (March & Smith, 1995). According to Alan Hevner, distinguished university
professor and eminent scholar at the University of South Florida, the goal of design science is
utility (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 1996). Design science projects employ the design cycle
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which is a smaller portion of the overall engineering cycle (Wieringa, 2014). The design cycle
includes problem investigation, treatment design, and treatment validation. An artifact is
created to treat the identified problem in order to meet the goals of people who have a vested
interest in the project, known as stakeholders. It is an iterative cycle where implementation
evaluation determines the level of success of the treatment implementation and may lead to the
beginning of a new design cycle if improvements are desired. Implementation evaluation and
problem investigation both are the start of new cycles. While problem investigation is the start
of a new cycle seeking improvement on the problem, implementation evaluation is a
continuation of the cycle started during problem investigation with the goal of evaluating how
effective the treatment is after it has been applied to the identified problem.

Figure 12 - Engineering Cycle (Martakis, 2015)

Problem Investigation
Problem investigation in design science focuses on improving upon a problem and the
reasons that it is important. Real-world design problems are addressed through design and
investigation of the problem and are driven by the goals of both the researcher and the
stakeholders.
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Figure 13 - Implementation evaluation (Martakis, 2015)

These stakeholders are those who are affected positively or negatively by the treatment
of the problem. Stakeholders have varying degrees of awareness and interest in the problem
being addressed and therefore have different desires. At the lowest level a stakeholder may be
unaware that a problem exists, has input no thought or resources to the treatment of the problem,
but would be affected by the treatment of the problem. At the highest level a stakeholder is
fully aware that a problem exists and has invested thought and resources to addressing the
problem. Stakeholder goals are defined as desires that the stakeholder has invested resources
toward, either time or money, to achieve the desired outcome (Wieringa, 2014). Stakeholders
who have not invested resources may still be affected by the treatment, but do not contribute to
the goals of the research.
For this research, the problem is identified as finding host-based dark web artifacts that
indicate criminal activity and can be used as evidence when the software used to access the dark
web is designed to leave little trace behind. Crimes committed on the dark web are problematic
for law enforcement. Criminals using the dark web rely on anonymity and encryption to stay
hidden. The dark web, including dark web markets and cryptocurrency payments, are not
widely understood by many law enforcement agencies. National law enforcement agencies
such as the FBI work to identify users with the goal of shutting down the marketplaces and have
achieved some success. Following multi-agency Operation Marco Polo that resulted in the
takedown of the Silk Road marketplace in 2013 there have been several more multi-agency
operations between the FBI and other U.S. and international agencies to shut down dark net
marketplaces. These operations include:
Operation Onymous in 2014 - that arrest of 17 individuals and take down several
online marketplaces (Décary-Hétu & Giommoni, 2017)
Operation Hyperion in 2016

targeted vendors and users (Cox, n.d.)
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Operation Bayonet in 2017 took down two leading darknet marketplaces Alphabay
and Hansa (Wegberg et al., 2017)
Operation Disarray in 2018

targeted vendors and users (FBI, 2018)

Operation SaboTor in 2019 (U.S. Attorne s Office, 2018)
Operation DisrupTor in 2020 (The United States Department of Justice, 2020)
Despite these successes, several dark net markets continue to operate.
Locally however, law enforcement lacks the training and resources to find the source of
these marketplaces but rather do have the ability to have an impact on the destination of dark
web contraband. An impact can be made by assisting local investigations in finding evidence
of dark web use. The primary stakeholders of this research are identified as the investigators
trying to solve crimes committed using dark web sites such as buying illegal drugs, identity
theft, weapons, terrorism, illegal pornography, and other criminal material.

Additional

stakeholders would be individuals who are victims of the crimes that are committed. These
victims include:
victims of violent crimes committed using weapons purchased on the dark web
victims who have their identity stolen
victims who have their bank accounts or credit cards compromised
victims of human trafficking or otherwise used to produce child pornography
victims of overdose caused by drugs purchased on the dark web
healthcare organizations that are treating patients who overdose on drugs purchased
on the dark web
the families of all of these victims who are helping their loved one recover from any
of these crimes

Research Questions
John W. Creswell is an academic who has written numerous journal articles and several
books on research and research methods ( Bio
research q es ions narro

John W Cres ell, n.d.). Creswell states that

he p rpose s a emen for research and become major signposts for

readers (Creswell, 2014). Design science uses knowledge questions that must be answered
and are either analytical or empirical. Analytical questions are answered by analyzing collected
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data while empirical questions are answered through observation and experience. The main
empirical knowledge question that is the focus of this research is What host-based artifacts
can be identified on a system running either Windows PC or macOS when the user has been
accessing the dark web using Tor or Tails?

To assist in answering this main question, follow-

up questions can be asked such as:
What methods or tools are used to remain anonymous when accessing the dark web?
What additional steps are users taking to further obfuscate their dark web activity?
What

traces

of

Tor

remain

in

the

Windows

Registry

after

use?

Is it possible to find what sites were visited while using Tor?
If a system is booted with a TAILS USB drive that supposedly leaves no trace, will any
traces of having booted to a USB remain? (Can BIOS memory be read to do this?)
The development of the proposed artifact, A Framework for Identifying Host-Based
Artifacts in Dark Web Investigations, by gathering information from previous works conducted
in the topic, through the investigations of existing tools, through information gained from
interviews with investigators of dark web crimes, through the advice of experts in the field and
the demonstration of the use of the artifact will answer these questions.

Artifact Design
Artifact design begins by specifying the requirements of the proposed artifact that meet
the goal of the stakeholders. The requirements are design decisions determined and argued by
the researcher as a method for contributing to the goals of the stakeholders. The absence of
currently available solutions brings the need for new artifacts to address the identified problem.
Previous research will be utilized that focused on Windows system memory and Windows
registry analysis (Darcie et al., 2015). This will be combined with research conducted that
located Tor remnants on a Windows 8 system (Jadoon et al., 2019) using Tor to visit Clearnet
sites and research on a Windows 10 system that installed Tor but visited no dark web sites.
These together as well macOS system artifacts, for which no previous research was located,
will create one comprehensive framework.
The requirements for the proposed framework are as follows:
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o Easy to follow the framework must be easy for investigators to follow so as to
not inhibit their investigation by requiring more effort than what is gained in
useful evidence.
o Consider Windows and other operating systems

it is possible for investigators

to receive multiple pieces of digital evidence when investigating a crime.
Windows and macOS are the two most common desktop operating systems,
therefore both will be explored for this research (Net Marketshare, n.d.).
o Consider multiple ways to access the dark web using Tor. Tor can be installed
on a hard drive, run from a flash drive, or run as part of the bootable TAILS
operating system. All three methods of access need to be explored.
o Be adaptable to future platforms.
Meeting these requirements would contribute to the goal of finding usable evidence of
dark web criminal activity by considering the different avenues the dark web can be accessed.
For the identified problem in this research, there is currently existing research that explores
artifacts left behind by the Tor browser bundle including memory dump analysis seeking Tor
artifacts (Dayalamurthy, 2013). Existing research also examines forensic artifacts produced by
the use of Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies (Doran, 2014) (Wadas, 2018). MacOS and Linux
RAM have been analyzed using the Volatility framework to produce artifacts not found in nonvolatile storage (Richard & Case, 2014). Digital forensic frameworks have been presented
using traditional physical crime scene procedures as a model (Carrier & Spafford, 2004).
Where the research appears to be lacking is combining all of these together to establish a unique
framework for examining a static system, non-volatile as well as volatile memory looking for
Tor artifacts, Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency signs, and web-based artifacts. An established,
easy to follow framework will assist investigators in narrowing their search when faced with
terabytes of data providing a roadmap to follow for finding usable forensic artifacts.
The following systems will be used for testing purposes for this study:
Fujitsu Lifebook laptop PC, model T725 with a clean version of Windows 10
installed
Apple MacBook Pro, model A1502 laptop with a clean version of macOS installed
Newly created TAILS bootable USB drive with version 4.3 installed
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Tor installed on a new, unused SanDisk 64 GB USB drive
First, the Windows machine will be imaged using FTK Imager and the macOS machine
imaged with Macquisition to produce a baseline image to ensure any data found during the
examination stage is created during testing rather than residing on the system. RamCapturer
for the Windows machine and Macquisition for the macOS machine will also be run to set a
baseline on both volatile and static memory (PAGEFILE.SYS in the case of Windows). The
open source tool Regshot will also be run on the Windows machine to get a baseline Windows
registry snapshot. Regshot is a tool that can monitor Windows registry changes. Once each
baseline has been created, each system will individually be booted using the TAILS operating
system, Tor opened, several sites which will be documented accessed both on the Clearnet and
dark web before exiting TAILS. Each machine will be restarted upon exit of TAILS and a
memory capture performed to determine if any residual trace resides after using TAILS. A
second image will then be captured on each machine to determine what, if any, traces of having
used Tor and visited dark web sites remains. Regshot will be run on the Windows machine
again to get a registry snapshot to compare to the initial.
Second, each machine will be booted into the installed operating system (PC or iOS)
and the Tor browser bundle will be started from a USB drive. Several sites will be visited,
including Clearnet and dark web sites before exiting Tor. System memory will be captured
using RamCapturer for the Windows operating system and Macquisition for the macOS
operating system. A system image will be created using FTK Imager for the Windows
operating system and Macquisition for the macOS system. Regshot will also be run on the
Windows machine again to get another snapshot for comparison to the original.

Once

completed, each machine will be powered off to erase any volatile memory retained by the
system.
Third, each machine will download and install the Tor browser bundle locally, then
started. Several sites will be visited, including Clearnet and dark web sites before exiting Tor.
System memory will be captured using RamCapturer for the Windows machine and
Macquisition for the macOS machine and a system image created using FTK Imager for the
Windows machine and Macquisition for the macOS machine. Regshot will again be run on the
Windows machine to gain a snapshot for comparison to the original.
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Step

Activity

Tool or technique

1

Baseline Image

FTK Imager/Macquisition

Baseline Memory Capture

Volatile and Non-Volatile

Ram Capturer/Macquisition

Beginning Windows Registry Snapshot

Regshot

Boot to TAILS

Tor opened, both Clearnet and
dark web sites visited and
authenticated, sites bookmarked

2

Second Memory Capture

Ram Capturer/Macquisition

Second System Image

FTK Imager/Macquisition

Boot to Operating System (Windows 10 and macOS)

Tor opened from USB drive,
both Clearnet and dark web sites
visited

3

Memory Capture

Ram Capturer/Macquisition

System Image

FTK Imager/Macquisition

Windows Registry Snapshot

Regshot

Boot to Operating System (Windows 10 and macOS)

Tor opened from desktop, both
Clearnet and dark web sites
visited

Memory Capture

Ram Capturer/Macquisition

System Image

FTK Imager/Macquisition

Windows Registry Snapshot

Regshot
Table 1 - Research Steps

Extraction

and

Analysis

The software used to perform forensic extraction and analysis:
Forensic Toolkit (FTK) Imager
Macquisition
RamCapturer
Forensic Toolkit (FTK)
Magnet Axiom
Regshot
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The captured images at each stage of research will be examined with both FTK and
Axiom as each forensic software has advantages and strengths.

Framework Creation
Using the structure of the open-source OSINT Framework created by Justin Nordine, a
reusable framework will be created that will allow investigators to click through a pathway to
locate the artifacts they are seeking. Using the OSINT Framework is a mechanism for
displaying and using the proposed framework rather than creating a paper-based framework to
follow. A basic starting point of this framework is shown in Figures 15-19. The branching of
the framework will be determined by the operating system being used; macOS, Windows, or
Tails. Once the operating system is chosen further branching will indicate whether Tor is
installed locally on the hard drive of the system or if it is started from a removable USB drive
while booted into the operating system. Upon the selection of the mechanism for starting Tor,
further branching will be revealed to indicate areas to being searching such as PAGEFILE.SYS,
Windows Registry, or the SQLite database PLACES.SQLITE which stores bookmarks,
favorites, and browsing history. Indications of cryptocurrency may be found in any of the above
locations and will warrant branching from the main line. Further branching will be added
during the course of the research as more indications of dark web use are located.

Figure 14 - Start of the framework
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Figure 15 - Framework showing options of Windows PC, macOS, and TAILS

Figure 16 - Further branching from Windows PC showing Tor installed locally vs. Tor run from a USB drive.
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Figure 17 - Further branching from macOS showing Tor installed locally vs Tor run from a USB drive

Figure 18 - Further branching of TAILS showing it being run on both Apple and PC hardware.
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Expected Contribution
Today, nearly every crime has a digital component. Investigators invest their time in
these cases in an attempt to solve serious crimes. The goal of these stakeholders is to find
usable evidence of dark web activity to assist their investigations. Digital evidence can be
found in different locations depending on the operating system being used and the method of
accessing the dark web. Windows stores information differently than a macOS system.
Accessing the dark web using Tor installed on a hard drive leaves different traces than using
Tor from removable storage. The ultimate goal of this research is to provide investigators with
a method that considers both operating systems and multiple methods for accessing the dark
web to maximize the amount of evidence located.
The artifact created for this design science research will be a reusable, comprehensive
framework for investigators to follow to find usable evidence that may be hidden in the vast
amounts of data they may be searching. Rather than simply displayed in paper form, this
framework will utilize the existing structure of the OSINT Framework created by Justin
Nordine (Nordine, n.d.) which is available as open-source software on GitHub. The underlying
design of the OSINT Framework will be modified to create a paperless framework that can be
installed for the user. Design science is the most appropriate method for this type of research
project as it focuses on creating an artifact, a framework to follow, to solve the problem of
locating evidence of dark web use on a computer that may contain terabytes of data. The use
of the open source software that was the basis for the OSINT Framework is simply a tool to
facilitate the use of the artifact, the created framework.

Treatment Evaluation
Treatment evaluation studies the designed artifact to determine if the effects of the
artifact meet the requirements specified by the researcher and ultimately contribute to the goal
of the stakeholders. According to Hevner et al., “A design artifact is complete and effective
when it satisfies the requirements and constraints of the problem it was meant to solve. (Hevner
et al., 1996).
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Figure 19 - Treatment validation (Martakis, 2015)

To ensure the validity of the process created during this design science project the
following steps will be taken. First, experimental evaluation will be conducted using a
simulation of the proposed framework. A clean system will be given to a voluntary user to
access dark web content using each of the three methods described above accessing several
dark web sites. After the completion of each method, the created framework will be used by
an investigator to identify artifacts generated as a result of this dark web use. Second, the image
file from a previously worked dark web case will be used both with and without the framework.
A comparison will be made using metrics such as total time for the analyst, ease of finding
artifacts, and error rate such as false positives and false negatives. Third, the expert opinion of
members of the South Dakota Internet Crimes Against Children taskforce (ICAC) and the
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) will be sought.

DCI and ICAC investigators

investigate many crimes including illegal drug purchases and child pornography. These agents
analyze numerous systems and have expert knowledge of the evidence needed to charge and
ultimately aid in convicting criminal suspects.
The framework created will demonstrate success during both validation steps as artifacts
of dark web activity can be located on the test systems. These artifacts would include, but are
not limited to, items such as .onion sites found in memory analysis, bookmarked sites in SQLite
databases, and Windows registry changes indicating the installation and use of the Tor browser
bundle. Identifying .onion sites in memory will aid investigators in knowing which dark web
sites the suspect is visiting. Sites bookmarked in Tor or Tails stored in the SQLite database
PLACES.SQLITE give indications of the favorite markets or forums of the user. Windows
registry changes indicate when the suspect first installed Tor and when it was last used or
possibly deleted. Indications of cryptocurrency use in memory, wallet keys, or bookmarked
favorites contributes to the evidence of dark web use as cryptocurrency is the payment method
during dark web transactions. Success of this framework will provide artifacts to investigators
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that will contribute to the evidence in cases where there is suspicion of a crime being committed
by using the dark web.

Timeline
The following timeline includes steps already completed, steps in process, and steps
proposed to complete this research.

Final Defense

Timeline

Today

Framework
Creation, Testing
and Validation

Proposal
Defense
Writing and
Review

Proposal Writing
and Review

Generate
artifacts/forensic
analysis

Interviews to Confirm
Need
Literature
Review
Topic Selection
and Refinement

J19

A19

S19

2019

O19

N19

D19

J20

F20

M20

A20

M20

J20

J20

A20

S20

O20

2020

Figure 20 - Timeline

Limitations
A limitation of this study is that this is covering only artifacts that are left on a host
while using the Tor browser to access the dark web. Other software exits for accessing dark
web sites including I2P and Freenet, however, Tor is the most popular browser used to access
the dark web ( 5 Dark Web Bro sers for Deep Web Bro sing in 2018, n.d.). Network
forensics can be used to attempt to identify users of the Tor network by monitoring entry or exit
nodes. Attempts can also be made to exploit vulnerabilities in the Tor browser to identify users
of the Tor network and therefore expose their use. Both of these techniques are beyond the
scope of this research.
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Summary
This chapter addresses the methodology to be used to complete this research project.
Design science research focuses on the creation of an artifact to address and add value to a realworld problem. The dark web is not well understood by law enforcement. It provides both
anonymity and encryption which often leads to criminal activity such as illegal drug purchases
and child pornography. The purpose of this research is to produce an artifact that is a framework
for digital forensic investigators of dark web crimes to follow to assist in locating evidence on
a host-based system. The data gathered for this research will use both a PC laptop with
Windows 10 installed and an Apple Laptop with macOS. Testing will be done to locate dark
web artifacts if Tor is installed locally or if Tor is run from a USB drive. TAILS operating
system will be tested by on Apple hardware and PC hardware. Validation for this research will
be sought from South Dakota ICAC task force and DCI investigators. The ultimate goal of the
artifact designed for this research would be to assist law enforcement in their investigations of
dark web crimes by providing an easy to follow framework for locating evidence of dark web
use on a computer system.
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CHAPTER 4 ARTIFACT DESIGN
This chapter discusses the creation of the framework using the methodology described
in Chapter 3 to answer the questions posed to facilitate the design. The Dark Web Artifact
Framework, found at https://arica-kulm.github.io/Dark-Web-Artifact-Framework/, was created
using the open source OSINT Framework by Justin Nordine as a template (Nordine, n.d.).
When opening the framework, circles in blue indicate further branching while circles in white
represent URL links in most cases. Starting with each operating system, the branching begins
with a decision of whether Tor was installed locally or from a USB or secure digital (SD) card.
If Tor was installed locally, the next branching provides options for whether Tor is still installed
or has been deleted from the system. The Tails branch provides steps for an investigator to
follow to first determine whether or not there is persistent storage on the imaged Tails drive. If
persistent storage exists, steps are provided for attempting to decrypt and reimage to identify
artifacts that the user saved. The Dark Web Artifact Framework contains branching for each
option that was researched with the end branch containing a link to a URL for further
information on that particular artifact. An effort was made to avoid sites that were for
commercial purposes or user forums in favor of those that contain articles or other useful
information. Sites that link to commercial sites link to those that contain blogs or other helpful
information and are not a link to a tool or product. The sites referenced are not intended to be
academically rigorous.
The default preferences for security and privacy in Tor were not changed for this
research. Users have the option to use a master password which enables saving logins and
passwords, site history can be remembered, and the security level can be changed to a different
level. None of those options were changed from their defaults, but rather used as installed. The
artifacts listed in the Dark Web Artifact Framework ma no al a s be fo nd on a s spec s
system and there may be additional artifacts that are not included in this framework. Both
Windows PC and macOS operating systems were booted using a USB drive with Tails installed,
used with the Tor Browser launched from a USB drive, and used with the Tor Browser installed
locally. Separate USB drives were used for booting to Tails and separate USB drives were used
for each operating system when the Tor Browser was launched from the USB. Each operating
system has unique artifacts that remain after using the Tor Browser either locally installed or
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launched from a USB drive or SD card. Artifacts were also gathered both with the Tor Browser
still installed on the local system and again after it was deleted. The purpose of this research is
not to compare the number of artifacts found for each operating system, but rather to identify
what artifacts are found leaving quantification to future research.

Anonymizing Methods or Tools
What methods or tools are used to remain anonymous when accessing the dark web?
Tor or another anonymizing browser is required to access the dark web. As outlined in
the introduction, Tor uses a series of relays to avoid detection and tracing ( Tor Projec , n.d.).
It is important to emphasize that methods to remain anonymous when accessing the dark web
are differen depending on he ser s in en . Remaining anon mo s o he si e being connec ed
o is differen han lea ing no race on he ser s hos system. The goal of the Dark Web Artifact
Framework is to determine host-based ar ifac s, so he ser s anon mi

o he si e being

connected to is not within the scope of this research. Refining the question being asked is
necessary to fit the scope of his frame ork. The q es ion hen becomes, Wha me hods or
tools are used to minimize any trace of host-based artifacts on the system used to access the
dark eb? . There are a arie of a s his can be accomplished and is largel de ermined b
the sophistication of the user. The methods used for this research included Tor run from within
the stand-alone operating system Tails, Tor installed on a removable drive such as a USB drive
and launched after booting into the operating system, and Tor being installed and launched
locally. All of these methods were performed both on a macOS and a Windows PC computer.
There are other methods that can minimize the host-based artifacts that would remain on a
system, such as running Tor in a virtual machine, that were not tested for this research. Using
these methods, the artifacts that remain under each circumstance were documented and used to
create a clickable, reusable framework. The artifacts are described below and displayed in
screenshots of the created Dark Web Artifact Framework. Dots on the framework that are blue
indicate there is further branching while dots that are white indicate either a stopping point or
a link to a URL explaining the artifact that is found.

44
Tor Installed Locally
The Tor Browser is available to be installed on different platforms and in 32 different
languages. Tor is available for Windows, OS X, Linux, and Android ( Tor Projec , n.d.). The
Tor Project website indicates the safest way to download the Tor Browser is directly from their
website, however they acknowledge it may not always be accessible if it is blocked by the
network of the user. Other alternatives include mirror sites or GetTor ( Tor Projec

Wha is

Ge Tor?, n.d.). GetTor is a service that automatically responds to user requests for a link to
download the Tor Browser from hosted locations such as DropBox, Google Drive, and GitHub.
GetTor can also provide the Tor Browser via email or via Jabber. On a Windows system the
downloaded file is an .exe file, on macOS it is a .dmg file. Launching the downloaded file
initiates the install just as other software is installed. The user has the option to change the
default install location, however for this research the defaults were accepted.
Windows Local Install
Installing Tor onto a Windows computer places the Tor Browser onto the Windows
desktop which puts the files in the /Users/<user profile>/Desktop/ file path. This local install
of the Tor Browser also leaves artifacts in many other locations. Below shows the branching
of the framework with Tor installed locally while still installed on the system.
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Figure 21

Windows Tor Local Still Installed

Launch Location
In addition to the location of the Tor Browser install files which contains the executable,
LNK files and other files needed to run Tor, there are several artifacts showing the launch
location of Tor including:
-

SRUM Application Resource/Network Usage - SRUDB.dat
Windows Defender logs MPLog*.log
Amcache Registry hive files Amcache.hve
Event logs
Application.evtx, Security.evtx, Microsoft-Windows-SecurityMitigations%4KernelMode.evtx, and other .evtx files
Prefetch Files firefox.exe*.pf, tor.exe*.pf, svchost.exe*.pf, and other prefetch
files
UsnJrnl a journal file used in Windows New Technology File System (NTFS)
$LogFile NTFS logging file
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Figure 22

Launch Location Artifacts

Tor Install Browser Artifacts
The Tor Project URL with the Tor executable file indicating that the Tor Browser was
downloaded is found and is dependent on the browser used. For Internet Explorer and older
versions of Edge it will be in WebCacheV01.dat file, for Chrome and newer versions of Edge
it will be found in an SQLite History file within the Edge/Default folder.
.onion sites
Artifacts remain for .onion sites that were bookmarked or add-ons that were installed
for .onion sites.

Places.sqlite contains Tor bookmarks with titles stored in the

MOZ_BOOKMARKS table and the corresponding .onion site is stored in both the
MOZ_ORIGINS table and MOZ_PLACES table. Artifacts left behind in the places.sqlite file
are dependent on whether or not the user creates a bookmark for a site. Users who are
knowledgeable or cautious may not bookmark sites in Tor, leaving no artifacts behind in
places.sqlite. Add-ons are found in the extensions.json file found in the Tor Browser install
location ( Find and ins all add-ons o add fea res o Firefo

Firefo Help, n.d.). Like
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bookmarks, if users do not install any add-ons there will be no artifacts from dark web sites in
the extensions.json file.
Memory Capture
A capture of system memory either while the computer is still running after having
accessed the dark web, or after a restart, reveals artifacts of .onion sites, images from dark web
sites, and LNK files indicating where the Tor Browser was launched from. Capturing memory
after the computer has been used to access the dark web, but prior to a restart, contains the most
artifacts. Restarting or shutting down the computer removes the artifacts that are left in volatile
memory; however, artifacts may remain in the pagefile.sys or hibefil.sys files. Artifacts that
can be found include .onion site names, images from dark web sites visited such as
marketplaces, and Tor Browser icons. URLs to dark web sites are generally not obvious in
determining whether the site that was visited is nefarious. To aid in determining what sites
have been accessed, using Magnet AXIOM forensic software or another forensics tool, a report
can be created by exporting the evidence found in either a comma-separated value (CSV) file
or an Excel spreadsheet file for further searching to determine the site contents.
Registry Files
There are multiple locations in the Windows Registry that contain artifacts from Tor
Browser. These are addressed in an upcoming question specific to the Windows Registry.
Downloaded Images
Images that are downloaded from sites while using the Tor Browser are saved to the
ser s Do nload folder.
Windows Timeline Activity
The ActivitiesCache.db file contains the URL of the Tor Project download site along
with the location the Tor Browser install executable file that was downloaded which can
indicate which user downloaded the file.
macOS Local Install
Installing the Tor Browser on macOS requires downloading the .dmg file. Once
launched, Tor Brower is installed when the user drags it to the Applications folder or other
location ( Ho

o: Use Tor on macOS S r eillance Self-Defense, n.d.).
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Figure 23

Tor Browser Files

macOS Tor Installed Local Artifacts

User

In addition to the Tor Browser application files that are installed, files that are installed
when a user installs and runs the Tor Browser can be found under that user in numerous
artifacts.
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Figure 24

macOS Tor Browser User Files Artifacts

Tor Browser Download
macOS contains an Application Support folder for users that contains support files for
running an application. For the Tor Browser, the TorBrowser-Data folder is created and
contains the supporting files for running the Tor Browser.
Tor Icons
Images from the Tor Project website can be found in the WebKitCache folder for the
user who installed the Tor Browser.
Safari History
Safari his or is loca ed in he ser s \Library\Safari folder and includes files that
contain links to the Tor Project website. The Downloads.plist file for the user contains the URL
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of the TorBrowser.dmg file and includes the date and time the file was downloaded. History.db
contains a link to the Tor Project site including the \download\ folder. RecentlyClosedTabs.plist
also contains a link to the Tor Project website \thank-you\ page.
Preference Files
Tor Browser information is found in .plist and other files in the \Library\Preferences\
folder

including

dock

items

in

the

com.apple.dock.plist,

quarantined

files

in

com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2, and volume and device identifier information
in com.apple.finder.plist.
Saved Application State
The Saved Application State is a macOS feature that saves the open screens of an
application when the application is terminated ( Con rolling Sa ed Applica ion S a es kr p ed,

n.d.).

The

user

profile

\Library\

folder

contains

an

entry

for

org.torproject.torbrowser.savedState.
Var Folders
The \private\var\ contains both file system event files and daily log file with Tor
Browser artifacts. The daily log file, daily.out, contains disk usage and network information
( Mac OS Dail Logs Sal Forensics, n.d.). The file system events files provide file and
folder modification and creation information and contains several references to the Tor
Browser.
KnowledgeC
The knowledgeC.db file contains an event log of processes that run within an Apple
device. The ZOBJECT table within knowledgeC.db contains a type called App/InFocus that
shows the date and time an application is being used ( Kno ledge is Po er! Using he
macOS/iOS knowledgeC.db Database to Determine Precise User and Application Usage
mac4n6.com, n.d.).
.onion sites
Artifacts remain for .onion sites that were bookmarked or add-ons that were installed
for .onion sites on a computer running macOS as they are on a computer running Windows.
places.sqlite contains Tor bookmarks with titles stored in the MOZ_BOOKMARKS table and
the corresponding .onion site is stored in both the MOZ_ORIGINS table and MOZ_PLACES
table. Artifacts left behind in the places.sqlite file are dependent on whether or not the user
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bookmarks sites. Users who are knowledgeable or cautious may not bookmark sites in Tor
leaving no artifacts behind in places.sqlite. Add-ons are found in the extensions.json file found
in the Tor Browser install location ( Find and ins all add-ons to add features to Firefox | Firefox
Help, n.d.). Like bookmarks, if users do not install any add-ons there will be no artifacts from
dark web sites in the extensions.json file.
Downloaded Images
As they are on a computer running Windows, images that are downloaded on a computer
r nning macOS from si es

hile sing he Tor Bro ser are sa ed o he ser s Do nloads

folder.
Memory Capture
A memory capture of a computer running macOS that has used Tor to access the dark
web is similar to a computer running Windows. macOS does not contain the pagefile.sys file
like Windows but does contain a swap file. Artifacts such as .onion addresses, Tor icons, and
images from dark web sites are all found.

Launching Tor from Removable Media
Installing Tor onto a removable drive such as a USB drive or SD card places the Tor
Browser install files onto the USB drive or SD card rather than the local hard drive of the
computer that Tor is launched from. Users may incorrectly think that doing this leaves no
artifacts, however that is not accurate. Launching Tor from a USB drive or SD card leaves
artifacts on the computer and on the USB drive or SD card.
Windows - Tor Run from USB
Many of the same artifacts that are found when Tor is installed locally are found when
Tor is launched from a USB drive or SD card such as the launch location, user information, and
downloaded images. Additionally, information about the USB drive or SD card that launched
Tor can be identified and matched to the USB drive or SD card if it is also located.
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Figure 25 - Windows Tor from USB (SD Card)

Artifacts Found on Windows Hard Drive
Launch Location
The location Tor was launched from is found in multiple artifacts similar to Tor being
installed locally on the hard drive. This is significant when running Tor from a USB drive or
SD card as there will not be an installed program on the hard drive, it can be clearly shown
where Tor was launched from.
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Figure 26 - Windows Tor from USB (SD card) Launch Location Artifacts

The launch location of Tor is found in the following:
-

SRUM Application Resource/Network Usage - SRUDB.dat
Windows Defender logs MPLog*.log
Event
logs
Security.evtx
and
Microsoft-Windows-SecurityMitigations%4KernelMode.evtx
UsnJrnl a journal file used in Windows New Technology File System (NTFS)

User Information
The Windows timeline activity file ActivitiesCache.db contains information on the user
that launched Tor. This file also shows the location Tor was launched from so could also be
included in the launch location section of the framework, however, to avoid redundancy it is
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included in this user information section. The Windows Shellbags file, usrclass.dat, also
indicates which user launched Tor.

Figure 27 - Windows Tor from USB (SD card) User Information Artifacts

USB (SD Card) Information
Information about the USB or SD card that was used to launch Tor including the make,
model, and serial number is found in the Windows Prefetch files for TOR.EXE, FIREFOX.EXE,
and may be found in other prefetch files such as SVCHOST.EXE. The Windows compatibility
appraiser also contains USB or SD card make and model information.
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Figure 28 - Windows Tor from USB (SD card) USB Information

Registry Files
There are multiple locations in the Windows Registry that contain artifacts from Tor
Browser. These are addressed in an upcoming question specific to the Windows Registry.
Downloaded Images
The default for images that are downloaded from sites while using the Tor Browser
when launched from a USB drive or SD card is the ser s Do nload folder ra her han o he
USB drive or SD card.
Artifacts Found on USB Drive or SD Card
If the USB drive or SD card is located, it can be shown through the artifacts on the
computer and the USB drive or SD card that it had previously been used to launch the Tor
Browser.
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Figure 29 - Windows Tor from USB (SD card) - USB (SD card) Artifacts

The artifacts found on the USB drive or SD card include the following:
-

Tor Files the Tor Browser installation files
.onion sites places.sqlite file contains bookmarked sites
USB serial # - he Start Tor Browser.lnk file con ains he serial n mber of he
USB drive
Firefox Add-ons
extensions.json file contains any add-ons the user has
installed

Memory Capture
A memory capture of a computer that has run Tor from a USB drive or SD card is similar
to installing and launching Tor locally. Capturing the memory after the computer has been used
to access the dark web but prior to a restart contains the most artifacts. A capture of system
memory either while the computer is still running after having accessed the dark web or after a

57
restart reveals artifacts of .onion sites, images from dark web sites, and LNK files indicating
where the Tor Browser was launched from.
macOS Tor Run from USB or SD Card
Similar to launching Tor from a USB or SD card when using Windows, launching Tor
from a USB while running macOS leaves artifacts on the hard drive, the USB drive, and in
system memory.

Figure 30 - macOS Tor from USB (SD card)

Artifacts Found on macOS Hard Drive
The artifacts found on the macOS hard drive including artifacts connected to the Tor
Browser, artifacts containing information related to the USB drive used to launch of Tor, and
downloaded images.
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Figure 31 - macOS Tor from USB (SD card) HD Image

Tor Browser Data / User Info
Running Tor from a USB drive or SD card still places files for running Tor Browser in
the Application Support folder like it does when installing Tor locally. The Application Support
folder resides within the user profile indicating the user that launched Tor Browser. Artifacts
also remain for preference files, the saved application state, and var folders when launched from
a USB or SD card as they do when installed locally.
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Figure 32 - macOS Tor from USB (SD Card) HD TorBrowser-Data/User Info

USB Drive or SD Card
Information about the USB drive or SD card used to launch Tor Browser can be found
in

the

CurrentPowerlog.PLSQL

file,

specifically

the

PLPeripheralAgent_EventForward_DeviceState table.

Additional Obfuscation Steps
What additional steps are users taking to further obfuscate their dark web activity?
Using Tor itself is an obfuscation technique, however users who are using Tor with
criminal intent may seek further methods of ensuring their activities are hidden. As stated in
the previous question, Tor can be run from both a USB drive or SD card inserted into the
computer, locally installed onto the hard drive of the machine being used, or as part of a
bootable operating system. Users may incorrectly assume that by running Tor from a USB
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drive or SD card that their system is safe since they are not installing to the local drive. Any of
these methods can leave behind artifacts either on the host machine or on the method used such
as a USB drive, SD card or the drive used to run Tails.
Users who install Tor locally on their system may delete Tor. The directions for
removing Tor from a system can be located in the Tor Browser manual found on the Tor Project
website ( UNINSTALLING Tor Projec

Tor Bro ser Man al, n.d.). These directions call

for the user of a Windows system to simply delete the folder or application and empty the trash.
On a macOS system the directions are similar, move the application to Trash, then locate the
~/Application Support/ folder, look for TorBrowser-Data folder, move it to Trash, then empty
he rash. The ebsi e no es ha he opera ing s s em s s andard
( UNINSTALLING Tor Projec

nins all

ili

is no

sed

Tor Bro ser Man al, n.d.). Users who are rushed or do

not fully complete either of these instructions can miss the step of emptying the trash or deleting
the TorBrowser-Data folder, so in creating this framework both the Application Support folder
on macOS and the Recycle Bin on a Windows machine were incorporated into the possible
locations for artifacts.
Users may take further steps of obfuscation such as clearing cache and cookies to
remove any trace of having downloaded and installed Tor or using a cleaning program such as
CCleaner ( CCleaner.com - Wha is CCleaner?, n.d.) to remove unwanted files and browsing
history. None of these options were performed during the creation of the framework so as to
provide the most possible locations that artifacts could be found on a system.
Windows Local Install Tor Deleted
Uninstalling Tor from a Windows system by following the recommendation on the Tor
Project website removes the Tor.exe executable file, places.sqlite, extensions.json file, and
other files contained within the TorBrowser folder but most of the other artifacts remain.
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Figure 33 - Windows Local Tor Deleted Launch Location

If the system has not been shut down, a memory capture may still contain .onion sites, Tor
Browser icons, and images of dark web sites. A user who wants to remove any trace of having
downloaded, installed, and launched Tor will need to take extra steps beyond the
recommendations.
macOS Local Install Tor Deleted
The instructions on the Tor website for removing the Tor Browser from a macOS system
are similar to removing Tor from a Windows system. Deleting Tor according to the directions
leaves many artifacts behind on macOS. Like Windows, the places.sqlite, extensions.json, and
other files that reside within the Tor Browser user files are deleted.
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Figure 34 - macOS Local Install Tor Deleted Tor Browser Files-User

What

traces

of

Tor

remain

in

the

Windows

Registry

after

use?

Is it possible to find what sites were visited while using Tor?
This becomes two separate questions as it is possible to find sites that were visited using
Tor, however they are not necessarily connected to the Windows Registry. The first question
is:

Windows Registry Artifacts
What traces of Tor remain in the Windows Registry after use?
Two of the three methods tested for this research, both running Tor from a USB drive
or SD card and installing it locally on to a Windows PC, leave traces in the Windows Registry.
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Booting to Tails happens before the locally installed operating system boots, so using Tails does
not leave traces in the Windows Registry.
Tor USB Install
Installing Tor onto a USB drive, then launching Tor from a Windows PC host machine
leaves several artifacts in the Windows Registry. Artifacts for both Tor and the USB drive that
was inserted can be identified.

Figure 35 - Windows Tor from USB (SD Card) HD Registry

Several artifacts of the Tor Browser are found in the NTUSER.DAT file for the user who
launched Tor in the SOFTWARE key including PropertyStore, AppBadgeUpdated,
Compatibility Assistant and the Firefox Launcher.
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Figure 36 - Windows Tor from USB (SD Card) NTUSER.DAT

USB drive or SD card information is found in several areas of the Windows Registry
including the SYSTEM key, SOFTWARE key, and registry log files. The make, model, and
serial number of the USB drive can be found in these entries. On their own, the make and
model of USB drive does not definitively prove that the USB drive or SD card in question was
used to start Tor. However, if the USB drive or SD card is also found with the computer in
question it can be definitively linked by locating the serial number on the USB drive and
connecting it to the entries in the registry. Shown below are the multiple locations in the
SYSTEM key.
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Figure 37 - Windows Tor from USB (SD Card) USB Registry SYSTEM

The SOFTWARE key, registry log files, and Amcache hive files also contain indicators of USB
drive and SD card use and identification.
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Figure 38 - Windows Tor from USB (SD Card) USB Registry Artifacts

Tor Local Install
Installing Tor locally on a Windows PC system leaves traces of Tor in both the
SYSTEM registry file and the NTUSER.DAT file of the user who installed Tor. This is true
both with Tor still installed and with Tor uninstalled from the system.
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Figure 39 - Windows Tor Local Registry

Figure 40 - Windows Tor Local Registry SOFTWARE

68

Figure 41 - Windows Tor Local Registry SYSTEM

Both still installed and uninstalled, Tor artifacts remain in multiple locations in the
SOFTWARE key of the NTUSER.DAT file of the user who installed Tor.
The second question is:

Dark Web Site History
Is it possible to find what sites were visited while using Tor?
The way Tor is used is relevant when locating host-based artifacts on a system that has
been used to access the dark web. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, for this research
the default settings of Tor were not changed. Changing the settings can alter the security of
what Tor saves. As installed, Tor allows for bookmarking websites and enabling add-ons which
leave artifacts behind in the places.sqlite and extensions.json files.

Figure 42 - places.sqlite
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If the sites being bookmarked are dark web sites, they can be identified by investigators.
The presence of the places.sqlite database file is dependent on where Tor was launched from
and whether or not the user has deleted Tor from the system. Tor launched from a USB drive
will leave the places.sqlite database file on the USB drive rather than on the hard drive of the
system. If Tor has been deleted from the system, it may no longer be on the system or may
show as a deleted file.
Add-ons that the user installs while using the Tor Browser will be found in the
extensions.json file, found in the same location as the places.sqlite file.

Figure 43 - Windows .onion Locations

Figure 44 - macOS .onion Locations

Memory Capture
A memory capture of a system that has been accessing the dark web also can reveal
traces of sites that were visited and images of both Tor and those sites. Each operating system
revealed dark web artifacts in memory. The number of artifacts is dependent on whether or not
the system has been shut down for a significant amount of time after the dark web site was
accessed, however traces can still remain in the pagefile.sys of a Windows system. Artifacts
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that can be found in memory include .onion sites, images from dark web sites, and Tor icons.
The operating system and whether or not Tor was launched from a USB drive or SD card or
installed locally are less important than if the system was shut down.

Figure 45 - Memory Capture Artifacts

Images that may be recovered include logos from dark web sites as shown below for Empire
Market, Tor Browser icons, and images downloaded from dark web sites.

Figure 46 - Memory Images

Tails
If a system is booted with a Tails USB drive that supposedly leaves no trace, will any traces
of having booted to a USB remain?
The Tails website states that using Tails leaves no trace on the computer (Abraham, Silva,
Decourcy, & Cardon, n.d.). This was confirmed during this research on both the Windows PC
and macOS systems independently. The hard drive of each system was imaged immediately
prior and again immediately after booting to the Tails USB drive resulting in matching hash
values for both systems.
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Figure 47 - Windows PC Hard Drive Image Hash Verification Prior to Tails
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Figure 48 - Windows PC Hard Drive Image Hash Verification After Tails
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Figure 49 - macOS Hard Drive Image Hash Verification Prior to Tails
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Figure 50 - macOS Hard Drive Image Hash Verification After Tails

Tails contains an option to create persistent storage if it is started from a USB drive. The
information stored on persistent storage can include documents, email, chat sessions, and other
software information. Tails warns about the security implications of creating persistent storage
with the persistent storage being protected by a passphrase. As with other passwords or
passphrases, the simpler the password the easier it is to compromise. When imaging a USB
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drive that has an installation of Tails with persistent storage enabled, it may not be obvious to
investigators that the drive potentially contains a significant amount of evidence. Creating an
image of the Tails USB drive using FTK Imager produces an image with both a Tails partition
and a TailsData partition (see below).

Figure 51 - TailsData Unrecognized File System

The TailsData partition is seen as an Unrecognized file system in FTK Imager requiring an
examiner to follow additional steps to read the data that has been stored in persistent storage.
Tails persistent storage is encrypted using LUKS encryption as can be seen below in the Hex
view of the Unrecognized file system.

Figure 52 - LUKS Encryption Indicated
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Being able to read the data stored within the persistent storage partition is wholly dependent on
he e aminer ei her kno ing he ser s passcode or being able o crack he passcode i h a ool
such as Hashcat.
A Tails USB drive from a user that sets a complicated passphrase is unlikely to provide
any useful evidence to an investigator. With a known or simple passphrase, an investigator has
several steps to go through to export, decrypt, and perform further steps to eventually be able
to examine the data and information contained within the persistent storage. The created Dark
Web Artifact Framework provides steps and links to further information to walk an examiner
through these required steps in order to reveal the hidden information.

Figure 53 - Tails Initial Branching

Upon acquiring the Tails USB, the examiner first images the drive using FTK Imager or similar
imaging ool. The q es ion is hen Does he dri e con ain encr p ed s orage? .

Figure 54 - Tails Encrypted Storage
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A user who has not enabled encrypted storage will leave no evidence on the USB drive so the
investigation of the drive would stop. The presence of encrypted storage would then move the
investigator forward to the next step of exporting the unrecognized partition as a raw .001 image
file using FTK Imager.

Figure 55 - Tails Export Unrecognized Partition

Once the image is exported, it needs to be decrypted before it can be examined. Tails uses
Linux Unified Key System (LUKS) encryption to encrypt the persistent storage partition ( Tails
- Pri ac for an one an

here, n.d.).

Figure 56 - Tails Decrypt, Mount, Copy, Reimage
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A tool that decrypts LUKS partitions is the cryptsetup utility for Linux. The .001 raw image
file is then copied to a Linux machine to perform the decryption. If the password is known the
decryption steps can move forward. If the password is not known a utility such as Hashcat can
be used to attempt to obtain the password ( hashca - advanced pass ord reco er , n.d.). Once
decrypted, the image can be mounted for viewing in Linux. To perform a full forensic exam
the decrypted image is copied back to the original forensics workstation and processed with
FTK. Artifacts that are recoverable include bookmarks in the places.sqlite file, which will show
sites that the user has saved including dark web sites. Nm-system-connections shows Wi-Fi
connections that the Tails drive has connected to and includes the Wi-Fi password. Other
artifacts include Pidgin log files which contain internet chat sessions, thunderbird email, and
stored passwords.

Figure 57 - Tails Process Decrypted Image with FTK
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Host-based Artifacts
The

i a

e i

f hi

e ea ch

be

ed i c ea i g he f a e

ki

Wha h

-

based artifacts can be identified on a system running either Windows PC or macOS when
he

e ha bee acce i g he da k eb

i gT

Tail ? .

This question has largely been answered by the answers to the previous questions. Both
Windows and macOS systems have numerous artifacts left behind when using Tor to access
the dark web whether launched from a USB, run locally, or run locally and deleted. As stated
earlier, the purpose of this research was not to compare the number or type of artifacts left
behind on each system, but rather to provide a framework for identifying these artifacts on each
system. The location of Tor, how it was launched, when it was downloaded and installed, the
user who downloaded and installed Tor, and many other artifacts remain. Proving the user of
Tor was accessing the dark web rather than using Tor for another purpose narrows the artifacts
to the places.sqlite file, extensions.json, and system memory. The memory artifacts can be
dependent on whether or not the system has been powered down, whether or not a pagefile.sys
on Windows or swapfile on macOS is configured.
Accessing the dark web using a Tails drive leaves no host-based artifacts on the
computer that launched Tails, however if the Tails drive is found, the persistent storage
container may reveal many dark web artifacts.

Conclusion
This chapter discusses the creation of the framework using the questions posed in the
methodology described in Chapter 3. Users may install Tor in different ways to try to remain
anonymous when accessing the dark web. Tor can be installed locally, installed on a USB drive
or SD card, or run from within a bootable operating system such as Tails. Depending on the
sophistication of the user, artifacts can be left behind in each case on both Window and macOS.
Further efforts to hide these artifacts include the user deleting Tor after it has been installed
locally which also leaves behind many artifacts. Traces in the Windows registry can be found
whether installed locally or run from a USB drive. Running Tor from within a bootable
operating system like Tails leaves no trace on the user s hard dri e; ho e er, if he dri e is
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found it may be possible to locate artifacts if the user has enabled persistent storage. Traces of
dark web sites can be found in both the places.sqlite file and system memory.
The Dark Web Artifact Framework contains branching for each of these options along
with links to more information on the particular artifact. Though the framework is detailed and
comprehensive, the artifacts listed in the Dark Web Artifact Framework may not always be
fo nd on a s spec s system and there may be additional artifacts that are not included in this
framework.
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CHAPTER 5 TREATMENT EVALUATION
This chapter discusses the steps taken to evaluate the created Dark Web Artifact
Framework. Treatment evaluation in design science research studies the designed artifact to
determine if the effects of the artifact meet the requirements specified by the researcher and
ultimately contribute to the goal of the stakeholders. Three separate evaluation steps were
undertaken to accomplish the evaluation of the created framework.
First, experimental evaluation was conducted using a simulation of the proposed
framework. A volunteer user was asked to generate dark web history on both a macOS laptop
and a Windows laptop by launching Tor locally on one machine, launching Tor from a USB
drive on the alternate machine, and launching Tails on either machine to create persistent
storage.
Second, the image file from a previously worked dark web case was used with the
framework and compared to the original investigation. This particular case involved a suspect
who had launched Tor from a SD card and accessed the dark web. A comparison was made in
the type and overall quantity of artifacts that were discovered as well as connecting the SD card
to the comp er o f r her sho

he ser s in en .

Third, the expert opinion of a member of the South Dakota Internet Crimes Against
Children taskforce (ICAC) and the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) was sought. DCI
and ICAC investigators analyze numerous systems and have expert knowledge of the evidence
needed to charge and ultimately aid in convicting criminal suspects.
The goal of these evaluations is to ensure that the requirements of this researcher were
met in the design of the created framework. The requirements as stated in Chapter 3 are as
follows:
o Easy to follow the framework must be easy for investigators to follow so as to
not inhibit their investigation by requiring more effort than what is gained in
useful evidence.
o Consider both Windows and macOS operating systems

it is possible for

investigators to receive multiple pieces of digital evidence when investigating a
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crime. Windows and macOS are the two most common desktop operating
systems, therefore both need to be explored (Net Marketshare, n.d.).
o Consider multiple ways to access the dark web using Tor. Tor can be installed
on a hard drive, run from a flash drive, or run as part of the bootable TAILS
operating system. All three methods of access need to be explored.
o Be adaptable to future platforms.
The three evaluation steps outlined above when combined meet the stated requirements.
The steps performed in this evaluation and the steps that were met are outlined below.

Simulation of Proposed Framework
The Dark Web Artifact Framework meets all four of the requirements set forth by this
researcher. First, both a macOS laptop and Windows PC laptop were reset to factory settings
to remove any personal files and a clean operating system installed. Next, for each operating
system, two new, unused USB drives were created with Tor Browser installed. Last, a new,
unused USB drive was used to create a Tails bootable operating system. The two laptops, two
Tor USB drives, and Tails USB drive were given to a volunteer user to generate dark web data.
The volunteer user was given the instructions to choose one machine to launch Tor from the
provided USB drive, choose the other machine to download and install the Tor Browser, and to
boot to Tails creating persistent storage. The investigator had no knowledge of which machine
was used for each purpose and was left to determine the details during the investigation using
the created Dark Web Artifact Framework.
Following the Dark Web Artifact Framework, the investigator was able to quickly and
easily determine, based on the artifacts located, that the volunteer user had launched Tor from
the USB drive on the macOS laptop and installed Tor Browser on the Windows laptop. Not all
artifacts indicated in the framework were located during the experimental investigation,
however new artifacts were discovered that were added to the framework.
Windows PC - Tor Installed Locally
On the Windows PC, indicators of Tor having been launched locally rather than from a
USB include the Windows LNK files and prefetch files indicating where Tor was launched
from, Tor Browser install executable file located in the downloads folder, places.sqlite file
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located on the local machine, and Windows registry entries. The section of the framework
shown below indicates the artifacts that were located on the Windows hard drive.

Figure 58 - Windows Hard Drive Verification Artifacts

The artifact details shown below are from for the Start Tor Browser.LNK file located
using

Magnet

AXIOM

Examine

forensic

software

indicating

a

path

of

C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\Tor Browser\Browser\firefox.exe. This artifact indicates that the Tor
Browser was launched from the Desktop of the Admin user which is the default location of the
Tor Browser when installed to a local machine.
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Figure 59 - Start Tor Browser.LNK file

The artifact details for the Windows prefetch files also indicating the Tor executable
found in the path \Users\Admin\Desktop\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Tor\Tor.exe.

Figure 60 - TOR.EXE Prefetch File

The Tor Browser download file was located in the \Users\Admin\AppData\Local\ folder
indicating that the Tor Browser install file was downloaded by the Admin user.
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Figure 61 - Tor Install Artifacts

Figure 62 - Tor Browser Install Executable

The

places.sqlite

file

was

located

in

the

\Users\Admin\Desktop\Tor

Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Browser\profile.default\ folder as directed by the
framework. This also indicates that Tor Browser was installed locally on the system rather than
launched from a USB drive or SD card.

Figure 63 - .onion Artifacts
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Figure 64 - places.sqlite Artifact

The Windows registry also contains indicators that Tor was installed locally.
AppBadgeUpdated, UserAssist, Shellbags, Compatibility Assistant, Mozilla Firefox Launcher,
Bam State, and AppCompatCache (also known as ShimCache) all contain traces of the Tor
Browser.

Figure 65 - Registry Artifacts
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Figure 66 - AppBadgeUpdated Artifact

Figure 67 - UserAssist

Figure 68 - Shellbags
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Figure 69 - Tor Browser in Shellbags

Figure 70 - Compatibility Assistant Artifact

Figure 71 - NTUSER.DAT Firefox Launcher Artifact

Figure 72 - SYSTEM Registry UserSettings Artifact
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Windows timeline activity file, ActivitiesCache.db, indicates both the Tor Browser install
executable file, torbrowser-install-win64-9.5.4_en-US.exe and firefox.exe file used to launch
the Tor Browser.

Figure 73 - ActivitiesCache.db Artifact

Figure 74 - ActivitiesCache.db Artifact for Tor Brower Install
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Figure 75 - ActivitiesCache.db Artifact for firefox.exe

Finally, the Tor Browser install files are located on the desktop of the Admin user.

Figure 76 - Tor Browser Install Location
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Figure 77 - Tor Executable Artifact

macOS Tor Launched from USB
The absence of the places.sqlite file on the macOS system, along with the presence of
Tor Browser files is an indicator that Tor was launched from a USB drive rather than installed
locally. Artifacts remain on the system but fewer than if Tor is installed locally. Like in
Windows, not all artifacts indicated in the framework were located during the experimental
investigation, however new artifacts were discovered that were added to the framework. The
framework branching for Tor Browser artifacts that contain TorBrowser-Data files or user
information is shown in the screenshot below followed by screenshots of the artifact as found
in Magnet AXIOM.
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Figure 78 - macOS Validation Artifacts
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Figure 79 - knowledgeC.db Artifact

Figure 80 - org.torproject.torbrowser.plist Artifact
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Figure 81 - com.apple.ATS.plist Artifact

Figure 82 - Saved Application State
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Figure 83 - CurrentPowerlog.PLSQL Artifact

The serial number of the USB drive is found in the image verification text file created
by FTK Imager and can be matched to device information stored in log files in macOS that are
located in the \private\var\db\diagnostics\Persist\ folder.

Figure 84 - USB (SD Card) Artifacts
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Figure 85 - FTK Image Verification Drive Serial Number

Figure 86

USB Artifact Serial #

Tails
A newly created Tails drive was given to the volunteer user to boot, create persistent
storage, and generate dark web data. Using the framework, the investigator was easily able to
follow the steps to first determine the existence of persistent storage.

Figure 87 - Tails Persistent Storage Branching Determination
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The presence of persistent storage can be determined immediately after imaging the
Tails drive by adding the evidence item and checking for the presence of a TailsData partition
which shows as an Unrecognized File System.

Figure 88 - Tails Persistent Storage

The TailsData partition was exported as a raw image and then copied to a Linux machine for
password recovery and decryption.

Figure 89 - Tails Password Branching

In this case, the password is unknown so Hashcat ( hashca - ad anced pass ord reco er ,
n.d.) was used to find the password (Password1!) meaning the investigation continues. If the
password had been unable to be recovered the investigation would stop.
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Figure 90 - Tails Decrypt, Mount, Copy, Reimage

The found password was used to decrypt the image using cryptsetup ( cr p se p, n.d.). Once
decrypted, the decrypted image was mounted at which time the contents of the drive can be
previewed on the Linux machine. To forensically view the data, it is copied back to the
Windows forensics machine and reimaged to obtain the valuable data stored within. In this
example, the existence of .onion sites marked as bookmarks were located in the places.sqlite
file. The nm-system-connections file contains the WiFi SSID and password of the system
connected to.
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Figure 91 - Tails Persistent Storage Branching

Figure 92 - Tails Persistent Storage Artifacts
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Figure 93 - places.sqlite Artifacts

Figure 94 - Nm-system-connections Artifact

Previous Case Comparison
Using a case previously worked at the Digital Forensics Lab at DSU, a comparison was
made of the artifacts identified in the original casework with artifacts identified using the
created framework. This particular case involved a user with a laptop with Windows 7 Home
installed who had launched the Tor Browser from a SD card. The suspect in this case was
thought to be purchasing drugs on the dark web. Indications of CCleaner, a program used to
remove things like unwanted files, temporary internet files, and unneeded registry entries, was
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identified during the exam which could limit some artifacts, however despite this several
artifacts were still identified ( CCleaner.com - Wha is CCleaner?, n.d.).
Using the framework during the examination of the SD card revealed new artifacts such
as Firefox add-ons in the extensions.json file. Additionally, and more importantly, using the
Dark Web Artifact Framework, the serial number of the SD card was located and matched to
artifacts located on the hard drive proving the user launched Tor from that particular SD card.

Figure 95 - SD Card Serial Number

Following the Dark Web Artifact Framework during the examination of the hard drive
of the laptop revealed artifacts in locations that were not discovered during the initial
examination. Files that were located using the framework that were not indicated in the initial
report include $UsnJrnl:$J, UsrClass.dat, Amcache.hve, Security.evtx, Application.evtx, and
MPLog-07132009-221054.log. During the examination of the registry, new artifacts such as
PCI and PCISTOR were located since the user launched Tor from an SD card. Keyword
searches conducted during the initial examination produced four Tor browser artifacts, where
using the Dark Web Artifact Framework produced all of those artifacts plus the eight additional
artifacts listed above. This evaluation demonstrates that the Dark Web Artifact Framework
allows an investigator to discover more artifacts than by keyword searches alone. The scope of
the original investigation included artifacts outside of those identified in the Dark Web Artifact
Framework such as cryptocurrency and drug references making comparing analyst time with
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and without the framework difficult. However, using the framework allows an analyst to point
directly to these artifacts. This direct linkage minimizes the necessity to further determine
whether these artifacts could be left behind for other reasons, thereby reducing false positives
and saving analysts valuable time.

Expert Opinion of South Dakota DCI ICAC Team Members
The primary stakeholders of this research are identified as the investigators trying to
solve crimes committed using dark web sites such as buying illegal drugs, identity theft,
weapons, terrorism, illegal pornography, and other criminal material. To assess whether the
designed framework contributes to the goal of the stakeholders, the expert opinion of practicing
digital forensic investigators was sought. The South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation
(DCI) Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) task force focuses on the investigation of
children who are exploited via the internet or electronic means (DIVISION OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION, n.d.). Five members of the ICAC task force were asked to evaluate the Dark
Web Artifact Framework and give their expert opinion on the ease, adaptability, and usefulness
of the framework. The credentials of the ICAC task force members as they provided them are
found in Appendix B.

Collectively, these five individuals have over 63 years of law

enforcement experience and over 28 years of experience in digital forensics.
To complete the assessment of the Dark Web Artifact Framework these investigators
were each asked the same set of questions to evaluate the effectiveness of the framework. The
list of questions posed can be found in Appendix C. The responses to these questions were
collected, analyzed, and are summarized below:
The step-by-step design of the framework makes it easy to follow and navigate. It is a
roadmap for locating dark web artifacts, with the breakdown between operating systems
providing additional focus and granularity. The framework provides efficiency for locating
artifacts, or ruling out the presence of artifacts, if following the framework returns a null result.
The interactive, decision-making steps brings awareness of multiple scenarios that may exist
during an investigation.
The framework could be adapted to anything that there is information and a need for.
For example, further branching could be added to accommodate changes or updates to specific
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operating systems, platforms, or conditions. Android and iOS options could be added as more
apps are available to access the dark web using mobile devices. The framework could also be
adapted to accommodate other scenarios, such as providing step-by-step instructions for
performing similar tasks with different software programs.
The links to further documentation and resources makes the framework useful and gives
detailed information about each artifact. This additional information provides supporting
documentation for investigators when completing forensic examination reports to support their
findings. The inclusion of macOS provides investigators who have less experience with macOS
a way to quickly navigate to those artifacts. Each examination that is performed is different so
using the framework is a way to quickly locate dark web artifact locations.
The rise in the number of devices requiring examination combined with the increasing
a
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The framework gives investigators a detailed listing of relevant artifacts that can be used as a
checklist to ensure artifacts are not overlooked. It eliminates the need to manually search
through the file structure. Investigators may be less familiar with file structures for some
operating systems, so the framework makes it easy to quickly determine if those artifacts are
present on a system. It also reduces the need to rely on keyword searches which may or may
not accurately reflect the presence of all artifacts.
Further enhancements could be made by having the links be more focused to provide
more specific, detailed information or to have information on artifact-specific anomolies
regarding operating system versions.
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Summary of Treatment Validation
The treatment validation steps described above demonstrate that the created Dark Web
Artifact Framework meets the requirements set forth by the researcher.
Easy to follow P
In each validation step listed above, the Dark Web Artifact Framework was easy to
follow when locating artifacts. Each step demonstrated the ease of locating artifacts and when
new artifacts were discovered they were added to the framework.
Consider both Windows and macOS operating systems P
Both Windows PC and macOS operating systems were considered and researched
extensively while creating this framework. When designing the Dark Web Artifact Framework,
data was generated and drives imaged and investigated on both systems. This was demonstrated
in the first validation step using a volunteer user to generate dark web data on both a Windows
PC and macOS system.
Consider multiple ways to access the dark web using Tor P
The dark web was accessed in multiple ways on each operating system when designing
the Dark Web Artifact Framework. First, each was booted using a Tails stand-alone operating
system. Next, within each operating system Tor was launched from a USB drive. Last, within
each operating system Tor was installed and launched locally. This was demonstrated in the
second validation step when comparing data from a previously worked case using the designed
framework. The previous case involved a Windows PC with a removable SD card that was
used to launch Tor.
Be adaptable to future platforms P
The Dark Web Artifact Framework was designed to branch into categories prior to
pointing to a specific folder or file location.

105

Figure 96 - Windows Artifact Categories

Future updates of either Windows PC or macOS operating systems may necessitate
different files or folder locations but the categories will likely remain the same. If the location
of artifacts changes to different folders or files, only the end branching of the framework would
require updating rather than starting over completely. The Windows categories of launch
location, Tor install browser artifacts, .onion sites, memory capture, registry files, images
downloaded, the Windows timeline and Tor Browser install files will all be relevant even if the
folder or file locations change. The same is true for the macOS categories of the Tor Browser
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user files, .onion sites, downloaded images, and memory capture. This similarity of categories
between operating systems demonstrates the adaptability to other platforms.
Additional branching of the framework can be added to account for other platforms.
Linux, virtual environments such as Whonix, and mobile operating systems of Android or iOS
could be added to create their own branching.

107

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This chapter discusses the accomplishment of the objective of this research, the
contribution, and limitations and future research. The dark web has become synonymous with
nefarious and illicit content in forum sites and underground marketplaces that sell weapons,
illegal drugs, stolen credit cards, stolen user credentials, child pornography, and more. Finding
traces of dark web activity indicating a connection to illegal material may be the difference
between a suspect being charged with a crime or being allowed to go free to continue to commit
more of these crimes. Meeting the objective of this research and making a contribution by
assisting in providing evidence that a user has accessed dark web market sites to acquire illegal
goods or services is valuable to investigators of these cases.

Objective Accomplishment
The primary objective of this project was to design a reusable framework that can be
used by digital forensic investigators when searching for host-based artifacts on a computer
where the use of the dark web is suspected in the commission of a crime. The objective was
accomplished with the Dark Web Artifact Framework created using the OSINT Framework as
a template. When using the framework, it provides choices to an investigator on the type of
system being investigated and the method used to access the dark web.

If during the

investigation it is discovered that artifacts are not being located using one method, it is easy for
the investigator to go back to another branch, or open multiple branches, in an attempt to locate
more or different artifacts.

In addition to host-based artifacts, the Dark Web Artifact

Framework provides branching to locate artifacts left on removable media such as USB drives
or SD cards. The framework also provides the means to link removable media to the computer
by locating the serial number on artifacts both on the removable media and the hard drive.
Lastly, the Dark Web Artifact Framework also provides a roadmap for investigators to identify
and decrypt persistent storage on a Tails USB drive.
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Contribution
A digital component can be found in nearly every crime committed today. The amount
of data that can be found on these devices is often measured in terabytes rather than gigabytes
leaving investigators thousands or hundreds of thousands of artifacts to pour through on a single
device. The reusable, paperless, comprehensive framework that was designed for this research
provides investigators with a map to follow to locate the necessary artifacts to determine if the
system being investigated has been used to access the dark web for the purpose of committing
a crime. Addressing both Windows PC and macOS was necessary as cases often include
evidence of both types. A resource such as this framework provides a time-saving method for
investigators to use.

Limitations and Future Research
One limitation of this research are the methods considered of accessing the dark web.
Both Windows PC and macOS were considered and accessed the dark web in multiple ways of
using a bootable operating system in Tails, launching Tor from a USB drive or SD card, and
installing Tor Browser locally. There are additional ways to access the dark web which were
not considered such as using a Linux machine, using a virtual machine such as Whonix, using
Orbot from an Android phone, using Onion Browser from an iPhone, or using an alternate
operating system such as Qubes. Future research to enhance the Dark Web Artifact Framework
would include the addition of other operating systems such as those mentioned above, in
particular mobile systems of Android and iOS. Mobile devices are increasingly the focus of
investigations with storage capacity of up to 512GB. This future research would be added as
further branching to the existing framework. A second limitation is that the focus of this
research was on host-based artifacts, network-based artifacts were not considered for this
research.
In the creation of this framework, a process itself was created that will contribute to
future works. The yes/no, if/then structure of the framework is adaptable to fit with workflows
in any area that would benefit from a recurring process.
This research addressed both Windows PC and macOS systems, however the purpose
of this research was not to compare the quantity of artifacts left on each operating system.
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Future research to consider would be quantifying the artifacts left behind on each operating
system to determine the footprint left behind when installing Tor. Removing Tor from each
operating system by following the directions on the Tor Project website ( UNINSTALLING
Tor Projec Tor Bro ser Man al, n.d.) removes the Tor install files but leaves many artifacts
behind. There are resources to be found for removing traces of Tor from each operating system
that could be combined into a helpful go-to guide for removing all traces of Tor from a system.
An additional future enhancement to consider is a method to take the information found
using the framework and provide an automatic method for transferring the information found
to the case report that investigators write. Case reports are a vitally important part of an
investigation that tells the story of the case. An automatic means of transferring the information
from the framework to the case report would be another time-saving and valuable step.
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APPENDIX A: DIGITAL FORENSIC ANAL SIS
METHODOLOG

Figure 97 - Digital Forensic Analysis Methodology Process Overview (Justice, 2008)

120

Figure 98 - Digital Forensic Analysis Methodology Process Overview (Justice, 2008)
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Figure 99 - Digital Forensic Analysis Methodology Process Overview (Justice, 2008)
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Figure 100 - Digital Forensic Analysis Methodology Process Overview (Justice, 2008)
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Figures 101 & 102 - Digital Forensic Analysis Methodology Process Overview (Justice, 2008)
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Name:
Position:
Background and Credentials:
Questions for evaluation:
o What made the framework easy to follow?

o How could this framework be adapted to future platforms?

o What did you find particularly useful about the framework?

o Describe the differences of doing an investigation with or without the framework.

o What could be added or changed to make it better?

